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THE COMING WAVE OF PRETEXTUALLY
PROFITEERING SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS:
A CASE STUDY AT THE NEXUS OF PROPERTY
AND CIVIL RIGHTS
DAVID GROSHOFF*
ABSTRACT
This Article builds on my prior publications employing case studies
that serve as the prisms through which this Article applies a legal analy-
sis to a newly trending problem in social entrepreneurship.
Specifically, this Article reviews the financial and property inter-
ests implicated when, in the milieu of an aging baby-boomer demographic
likely to display decaying neurocognitive abilities, ostensibly socially be-
neficent limited liability companies (“LLCs”) pretextually pose as small
businesses with a desire to serve people suffering from particular alleged
mental disorders. In reality however, these brand-managed social entre-
preneurs may represent conveniently detachable arms of integrated cor-
porate enterprises that have hundreds of millions of dollars and hundreds
of employees backing them.
Thus, the integrated corporate enterprise uses the LLC and an as-
sociated small-business-owner tale to manipulate antidiscrimination law
through which the integrated corporate enterprise can (i) exploit (a) small
municipalities’ zoning ordinances, and (b) relative funding and legal spe-
cialization deficiencies; and (ii) threaten municipalities with costly legal
action, should the municipality fail to change its zoning ordinances to
permit the integrated corporate enterprise to operate a twenty-four-hour
commercial business deep in the heart of real property historically zoned
* Despite this Article’s conclusion based on legal analysis, I remain a strong proponent of
fair housing and believe that the basis of a municipality’s or a tribunal’s zoning ordi-
nance, variation, or conditional use permit should occur via nondiscriminatory evaluative
processes. I thank the many helpful government employees at the numerous state and
municipal agencies in Ohio for providing me with quick access to relevant documentation
without having to conduct Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests. I also thank
Jani Lane and Kevin DuBrow for demonstrating to me that one’s best writing often goes
underappreciated, while one’s worst writing often appeals to the masses. I believe this
manuscript will fall in the former category.
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for single-family residential use. As a result, the integrated corporate
enterprise’s actions leave all but itself drowning in the spillover effects
of the enterprise’s negative externalities, including the risks of material
(i) physical harm to existing real property owners and residents—whether
young children or the elderly—and (ii) financial losses to (a) existing real
property owners and (b) municipalities who must internalize the inte-
grated corporate enterprise’s externalities, thereby leading to a forced
socialization of what would otherwise be a private cost.
Because this Article concerns an area of the law that lacks uni-
form or model legal codes from which one could otherwise address this
problem and propose a broad-brush and purely theoretical solution, this
Article employs a case study method to dissect trending issues too na-
scent and interdisciplinary to be covered in existing legal literature. As
a result, the Article employs a granular, fundamental, bottom-up analysis
to serve as a microcosm through which the Article arrives at its broader
descriptive understandings and prescriptive solutions and conclusions
that should spark further debate on this growing area of concern.
As the nation’s age demographic shifts, the Article’s analysis should
educate and advance dialogue among interdisciplinary scholars, legal tri-
bunals, and municipalities relative to this emergence in social entrepre-
neurship. The Article also serves to assist legitimate healthcare providers
in avoiding the errors made by certain large corporate integrated enter-
prises so that people suffering from disabilities indeed receive the care
and the housing that they may seek. The Article proposes ways in which
municipalities can ensure that they do not become the victim of purported
social entrepreneurs attempting to extract literal and figurative economic
rent-seeking, which then leads the municipality and existing property
owners to seek declaratory relief from the courts, thus engaging in their
own mental health-based quiet riot.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that for over thirty-five years you have lived in a single-
family home located in a suburban municipality twenty minutes from a
mid-major city in the Midwest. Further, imagine that the location of your
home—which you purchased in reliance on the neighborhood being zoned
as single-family residential housing—offers safe yards, streets, and side-
walks, quiet and respectful neighbors represented by diverse individuals
and families, service along with neighboring municipalities by outstanding
schools, and a location nestled on a small cul-de-sac containing only five
homes, with all five driveways situated in the circle of the cul-de-sac.
Now imagine that one LLC purchases twenty percent of the hous-
ing on the cul-de-sac, another related LLC submits an application for a
conditional use permit (“CUP”) to vary the zoning on that cul-de-sac to
allow the second LLC to open a commercial enterprise that would oper-
ate twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, on nearly 100% of the
property. Further imagine that representatives of a multimillion-dollar
real estate conglomerate, rather than either LLC, begin negotiating and
threatening the municipality with federal and state antidiscrimination
claims on behalf of the second LLC, should the municipality continue to
enforce its pre-existing zoning ordinance.
This Article addresses those issues by building on my existing re-
search program and scholarly publication base that uses current multiple1
or single2 case studies as an analytic tool to apply legal theory to fact.
1 See, e.g., David Groshoff, Contrepreneurship? Examining Social Enterprise Legislation’s
Feel-Good Governance Giveaways, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 233 (2013) (employing a multiple
case-study analysis with global social enterprises to support the article’s thesis that the
post-2007 legislative movement to create new social entrepreneurial business forms—
including benefit corporations, public benefit corporations, low-profit limited liability
companies (“L3Cs”), and flexible purpose corporations—represent a con to investors).
2 See, e.g., David Groshoff, Unchartered Territory: Market Competition’s Constitutional
Collision with Entrepreneurial Sex-Segregated Charter Schools, 2010 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
307, 344–54 (2010) (using the social entrepreneurial endeavor of an upstate New York
all-boys charter school as the article’s single case-study subject).
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Specific to this context, using a single case-study analysis helps develop my
research program’s thesis by exposing flaws in purported socially beneficial
companies, whether formed under state benefit corporation statutes,
designated as socially beneficial by a third-party rating agency, or simply
engaged in perceived socially beneficent activities under traditional busi-
ness law doctrine.
In particular, this Article analyzes the hypothetical of a business
organization that claims to engage in a socially beneficial activity—
providing housing to people with disabilities—despite the business orga-
nization: (i) lacking such a stated purpose in the business’s formation docu-
ments, i.e., the charter; (ii) being part of a massive corporate integrated
enterprise that (a) acts as a sole, socially beneficial, business organization
unto itself when advantageous to the integrated enterprise, but (b) attempts
to act as a part of a broader legally integrated enterprise when detrimental
to the sole socially beneficial business organization’s goals of generating
revenue for the integrated enterprise; and (iii) attempting to threaten
a small municipality with claimed violations of federal and state anti-
discrimination law relative to the municipality’s enforcement of its pre-
existing zoning ordinances.
The Article then applies this hypothetical to an actual case study
involving certain understandings of what would occur when the City
of Montgomery, Ohio, a relatively small upper-middle-class suburb of
Cincinnati that has displayed traditionally well-defined and strongly
enforced zoning ordinances, would meet a business organization mask-
ing itself as a socially beneficent LLC that practically is an arm of a
greater corporate integrated enterprise threatening to sue the small
municipality in federal court by claiming housing discrimination by the
municipality, should the integrated enterprise fail to achieve a net
present value on the Montgomery project.
This Article first describes the background and apparent inte-
grated corporate enterprise surrounding adult care facility operators
such as Our Family Home. Next, this Article cites and describes in great
detail why the federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) is inapplicable to a
situation akin to the one facing Montgomery. Third, this Article explains
why state law does not support the position that a CUP must be granted
by a municipality. The Article next addresses how the municipality’s
zoning ordinance does not align with the desires of the CUP application.
Fifth, this Article addresses inconsistencies and concerns advanced by
an applicant or its agents. Finally, this Article argues that municipalities
in the situation faced by Montgomery appear to be well within their fed-
eral, state, and local rights to reject conditional use applications without
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fear of a losing—or costly—court battle. This Article suggests—under
federal, state, and local laws, rules, regulations, ordinances, case law, and
public policy—that existing residents of a municipality live under an
expectation and reliance that the municipality will enforce its zoning
ordinances on a uniform and consistent basis. As a result, the Article
concludes that as the age demographic in the United States shifts due to
an aging baby boomer population, both law and policy currently supports
municipalities in Montgomery’s position to reject any CUP application.
I. CASE STUDY BACKGROUND: THE APPLICATION, INTEGRATED
ENTERPRISES, AND INQUIRING WHO ARE THESE LLCS?
Given the conditions precedent to Montgomery sending its notice of
hearing to certain residents and homeowners,3 and based on the documen-
tation that Montgomery has made publicly available for research purposes,
this Article presumes that the June 7, 2013 letter to Montgomery on Our
Family Home letterhead reflects the CUP application (“the Application”).4
The Application is “to operate an Adult Family Home5 for up to five Alzhei-
mer’s and/or dementia patients at an existing single family house”6 located
on a five-lot cul-de-sac within a single-family residentially zoned area.
All “Adult Care Facilities” (“ACFs”) must be licensed by the state’s
department of mental health (“DMHSA”).7 Several varieties of ACFs exist,
with two major types serving as the general varieties of ACFs, (i) Adult
Family Homes (“AFHs”), which have five or fewer residents, and (ii) Adult
Group Homes (“AGHs”), which have between six and sixteen residents.8
This Article assumes that the applicant for the ACF-based CUP is “Our
Family Home” or “Our Family Home Operating Co., LLC”—neither of
which represents the legal entity who purchased the property from the
prior owner, which creates numerous other issues addressed in this Article.
Our Family Home attempts to brand itself as an empathetic, socially
beneficent entity founded by a sympathetic man who has claimed deep
3 See MONTGOMERY, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES, tit. XV, ch. 150.16, § 150.1601 (2005).
4 Letter from Mark A. Damante, Vice President of Our Family Home, to Tracy Roblero,
City Planner of the City of Montgomery (June 7, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter
The Application].
5 See discussion of Adult Family Homes, infra Part II.
6 Undated Notice of Public Hearing from City Administrator Frank Davis to Residents
of Montgomery (on file with author) [hereinafter Notice of Public Hearing].
7 Ohio Adult Care Facilities Organization, http://www.ohioadultcarefacilitiesassociation
.org/, archived at http://perma.cc/QV6Q-CYZ5 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
8 OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5122-33-01 (2014).
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personal connections with the issues of dementia and Alzheimer’s.9 Our
Family Home’s website claims that the “founder and CEO of Our Family
Home . . . has always had a passion to serve individuals with Alzheimer’s
and memory loss.”10 The website further describes the CEO as “the Na-
tional Alzheimer’s Ambassador to educate, and discuss issues/concerns
with local, state, and federal legislators.”11 According to the website, the
CEO “is a trained speaker of the local Alzheimer’s Speakers Bureau, which
goes out into the community to educate small and large organizations
about Alzheimer’s disease”12 and “knows the importance of family.”13
Not only in the Application but also in discussions with the munic-
ipality regarding the subject property,14 the communications between Our
Family Home and Montgomery did not include the CEO. Instead, the com-
munications were between Montgomery and Mark Damante.15 In addition,
the purchaser of the subject property from the prior individual owner16
was not Continental Real Estate, Our Family Home, or Our Family Home
Operating Co., LLC. Rather, the purchaser was OFH Properties, LLC,
whose statutory agent is Mark Damante.17
A. Is Our Family Home Co. LLC an Integrated Enterprise with the
Continental Real Estate Enterprises?
According to the global WHOIS domain name registration data-
base, the owner of continental-realestate.com is Continental Real Estate
Companies.18 Over the years, Continental Real Estate Companies, whose
original corporate name is “Continental Building Systems, Inc.,”19 has
9 OUR FAMILY HOME, http://www.ourfamilyhomeinc.com, archived at http://perma.cc/F5AV
-SQF5 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
10 Founder, OUR FAMILY HOME, http://www.ourfamilyhomeinc.com/founder.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/5B2B-2WEB (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 E-mail from Mark Damante to Frank Davis (June 17, 2013, 11:29 AM) (on file with author)
[hereinafter E-mail].
15 Id.
16 Parcel Info Summary, DUSTY RHODES, HAMILTON CNTY. AUDITOR, http://www
.hamiltoncountyauditor.org/realestateii/ROVER30.ASP, archived at http://perma.cc/G689
-VJSW (accessed by selecting “Parcel ID” and entering 6000080039900) (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015).
17 Id.; see also OFH PROPERTIES, LLC, ARTS. OF ORG. (CHARTER) FOR A DOMESTIC FOR-PROFIT
LTD. LIAB. CO., NO. 210089 (Ohio Sec. of State Doc. No. 20121090343 (Apr. 16, 2012)).
18 See Query of Continental-RealEstate.com, WHOIS, http://www.whois.com/whois/continental
-realestate.com, archived at http://perma.cc/63SF-348N (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
19 See generally Receipt of Filing Articles of Incorporation from State of Ohio to Benjamin
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filed the necessary paperwork with the Ohio Secretary of State to use
“Continental Realty” as a fictitious name20 and “Continental Building
Services” as a trade name for Continental Realty.21 Continental Building
Systems’s stated corporate purpose in its charter includes provisions to
“construct office and commercial buildings.”22 One of Continental Building
Systems’s fictitious business names is a major residential project called
Hallmark Communities, Ltd., a meaningful provider of college student
housing from Ohio to Tennessee to Louisiana.23
Continental Realty is a large-scale real estate player that boasts of
its investment services,24 its property management services,25 and its prop-
erty maintenance services.26 Prominently displayed on Continental Realty’s
investment services webpage, for example, is “New Albany Medical Center,”
a medical facility in New Albany, Ohio “[c]onnected to New Albany Surgical
Hospital.”27 Continental Realty thus appears to have significant familiarity
L. Zox, Incorporator (Mar. 19, 1984) (Receipt No. 52654) (referencing corporate charter
number 630170), in Certificate of Incorporation, SEC’Y STATE OF OHIO, Roll F413 at Frame
1050 of the Records of Incorporation & Misc. Filings (Mar. 13, 1984).
20 See, e.g., Certificate of Incorporation, SEC’Y STATE OF OHIO, Roll 4151, Frame 0387 of the
Records of Incorporation and Misc. Filings (Feb. 4, 1994).
21 See Record of Trade Name Certificate, SEC’Y STATE OF OHIO (Doc. No. 200912700150)
(May 6, 2009) (referencing corporate charter number 630170); see also Renewal of Ficti-
tious Name Certificate, SEC’Y STATE OF OHIO, Roll 5649 at Frame 1101 of the Records of
Incorporation & Misc. Filings (Oct. 3, 1996) (giving the fictitious business name for which
Continental Real Estate Companies filed).
22 See Receipt of Filing, supra note 19.
23 See Our Projects, HALLMARK CAMPUS CMTYS., http://www.hccliving.com/our-projects.aspx,
archived at http://perma.cc/PG6Z-UUYT (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (describing what
Hallmark Communities, Ltd. does and its location), and Renewal of Fictitious Name Certif-
icate, SEC’Y STATE OF OHIO, Roll 5649 at Frame 1101 of the Records of Incorporation &
Misc. Filings (Oct. 3, 1996) (filing by Continental Real Estate Companies for Hallmark
Communities, Ltd.).
24 The Mills/Montooth Investment Services Group, CONT’L REALTY, http://www.continental
-realty.com/investment-services/home.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/Y7TG-RBE2 (last
visited Mar. 15, 2015).
25 Commercial Real Estate Property Management in Columbus, Ohio, CONT’L REALTY, http://
www.continental-realty.com/Services/Property-Management.aspx, archived at http://perma
.cc/K67F-3W3J (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
26 See Columbus Property Maintenance Service, CONT’L REALTY, http://www.continental
-realty.com/Services/Property-Maintenance.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/5H93-8PL3
(last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
27 Listing of Village of New Albany Business Park—Available Office Space, NEW ALBANY,
http://www.newalbanyohio.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Bus-Pk-Avail-Office-Space
-102.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (leading a reasonable person to question why the
Enterprise simply does not develop its facility in Montgomery in the Bethesda North medical
area, zoned for use of this type).
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with commercial real estate development, including commercial medical
facility development. Continental Building Systems’s webpage further
boasts of Continental Building Systems being a $250 million company,
using the tagline “Trust begins with people who care.”28 Perhaps this refers
to the trust of people who must care primarily about maximizing share-
holder value over any other stakeholder (e.g., tenant) value, per longstand-
ing, legally imposed fiduciary duties.29
Given the apparently integrated enterprise business lines30 among
Our Family Home Operating Co., LLC, OFH Properties, LLC, Continental
Realty, Continental Business Systems, Inc., Continental Real Estate,
Hallmark Communities, Ltd., Our Family Home, and others (collectively,
the “Integrated Enterprise”), the Integrated Enterprise may employ certain
entities as separate legal persons when it suits the needs of the Enterprise
while using other areas of the Enterprise when it does not suit the Enter-
prise’s value maximizing needs. As a result, one logically wonders the
following: (1) Who but various arms of the Integrated Enterprise would
make modifications to the real property and improvements to comply
with the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”)? Who would manage
the property?;31 (2) Who but various arms of the Integrated Enterprise
would represent the employer of twenty-four-hour caretakers at the subject
property?;32 and (3) Who could reasonably argue that this scenario does
not represent a commercial enterprise seeking to avail itself of federal
antidiscrimination laws as revenue generation protection, rather than a
28 Our Story, CONT’L BLDG. SYS., http://www.continental-buildingsystems.com/About-Us
.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/3J2R-3A3Z (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
29 See, e.g., Granada Invs., Inc. v. DWG Corp., 823 F. Supp. 448, 459 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (stating
that “the sole duty of a corporation’s officers is to maximize shareholder wealth”); see also
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). In its enduring statement, the
Supreme Court of Michigan famously asserted the following:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit
of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for
that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end
itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits
among its stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes . . . . [I]t
is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and con-
duct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of share-
holder and for the primary purpose of benefiting others.
Id.
30 See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS 1–3 (2d ed.
2011 & Supp. 2011–2012).
31 See E-mail, supra note 14.
32 Id.
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residential enterprise helping persons with Application-specific alleged—
but nondiagnosable—disabilities?33 Such a scenario and use of an Inte-
grated Enterprise is inequitable and contrary to public policy.
B. Assuming an Integrated Enterprise Exists, How Could the
Applicant Receive Authorization to Operate?
The Applicant underscores the unfortunate behavior of certain social
entrepreneurs. For example, Ohio’s Administrative Code mandates two
things. First, regardless of which of the Integrated Enterprise’s fictitious
names or divisions would constitute the “operator” for purposes of comply-
ing with state law, each Adult Housing Facility (“AHF”) property requires
a separate license from the Ohio Department of Mental Health and Ad-
diction Services.34 Because of the interchangeable personnel within the
Integrated Enterprise, in this case study, the Applicant currently appears
ineligible for a license under the Ohio Administrative Code.35 Ohio requires
an application review process in which the director considers the following:
[A]ny information regarding the past record of the owner . . .
and any individuals who are principal participants in an en-
tity that is the owner or manager in operating facilities
providing care to adults. The director shall consider whether
any of the following actions have been taken against any of
those individuals: . . . (6) Denial, suspension, or revocation
of a professional license.36
A law license is a professional license. A strong argument exists
that Damante constitutes a principal participant in the subject matter,
given not only his e-mails on behalf of the Applicant, but also his having
executed the Application submitted to the municipality. Yet as of this
writing, Damante has been suspended for the past decade by the State
Bar of Texas, according to the State Bar of Texas’s website and Membership
Department.37 For this reason, material questions exist as to whether the
Integrated Enterprise even qualifies to receive AFH licensure.
33 See detailed discussion regarding Alzheimer’s and Dementia, infra Part II.B.2.b.
34 OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5122-33-02 (Supp. 2012–2013).
35 Id. § 5122-33-04(B)(6).
36 Id. (emphasis added).
37 Find a Lawyer, Mr. Mark A. Damante, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, http://www.texasbar.com
/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Find_A_Lawyer&template=/Customsource/MemberDirectory
/MemberDirectoryDetail.cfm&ContactID=234266, archived at http://perma.cc/3UUE-8JFP
(last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
2015] PRETEXTUALLY PROFITEERING SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS 667
Second, at the time of the Application, Ohio’s statutory regime
indicated that failure to maintain such license, certification or other ap-
proval requirements would result in revocation of the home’s conditional
use certificate.38 As a result, the possibility exists that either the Ohio li-
censing agency did not investigate the Applicant’s background, the Appli-
cant creatively used the Integrated Enterprise to its advantage by hiding
Damante on the Integrated Enterprise’s prior applications, or the Appli-
cant or the Integrated Enterprise misled the state agency regarding this
decade-long suspension of his professional license.
Nonetheless, the primary aim of the enterprise is to maximize
economic value for its owners. As the baby-boom generation ages, a sub-
stantial likelihood exists that purported socially beneficial companies will
engage in tactics necessary to avail themselves of the federal protections
which Congress likely intended to protect natural persons, rather than
state-chartered corporations and limited liability entities.
II. FEDERAL LAW
As a result, if an Application to operate an AFH is rejected, the
Enterprise may threaten legal action based on federal and state antidis-
crimination laws. Regardless of how much saber-rattling in which an appli-
cant or its legal representatives may engage, such threats do not satisfy the
myriad of legal mandates imposed on the AFH applicants if it chooses to
pursue an antidiscrimination claim under federal, state, and local law.39 As
one legal scholar noted: “[I]n a handicap[-]discrimination case[,] the person
alleging discrimination must establish that the person or persons to live in
the residence in question is or are ‘handicapped’ as defined in the FHAA.”40
A. The Federal Preemption Doctrine
First, as Justice Souter stated: “federal pre-emption of state law
is only to be found in a clear congressional purpose to supplant exercises
38 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5119.34 (LexisNexis 2015) (today, the code states that the
“department may refuse to issue or renew and may revoke a license if it finds the facility
is not in compliance with rules . . . .”).
39 See infra Part IV.
40 Robert L. Schonfeld & Seth P. Stein, Fighting Municipal “Tag-Team”: The Federal Fair
Housing Amendments Act and Its Use in Obtaining Access to Housing for Persons with
Disabilities, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 299, 307 (1994) (citing Oxford House, Inc. v. Twp. of
Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 458–60 (D.N.J. 1992) (prospective residents of group home
for recovering drug addicts) and Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 728–30
(S.D. Ill. 1989) (residence for AIDS sufferers)).
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of the States’ traditional police powers.”41 Under the Federal Fair Housing
Act, no clear congressional intent existed to preempt state law in many
situations facing municipalities,42 demonstrating that if that were indeed
the case, then logically no state law discrimination cases could exist in the
provisions of a state statutory scheme to either mirror the Federal Fair
Housing Act or be litigated thereunder.43 As a result, the preemption doc-
trine would not apply to remove this case study from an analysis under a
federal antidiscrimination statute.
B. Applying the Federal Fair Housing Act to the Case Study
1. History and Background of Fair Housing Act
To prevent racial discrimination in housing, Congress enacted
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act in 1968, more commonly known as the
“Fair Housing Act” (“FHA”).44 Via the Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988 (“FHAA”), Congress amended the FHA to prevent discrimination
in housing, based on certain other characteristics, such as being handi-
capped.45 The FHAA defines “handicap” as “(1) a physical or mental im-
pairment which substantially limits one or more of [a] person’s major life
activities, (2) a record of having such an impairment, or (3) being regarded
as having such an impairment.”46
The regulations promulgated under the FHAA state that a “[p]hysi-
cal or mental impairment includes . . . [a]ny physiological disorder or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss,” or “[a]ny mental or
psychological disorder.”47 These regulations also define “major life activities”
to include “caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working.”48 Given that the term
“disability” has become accepted and preferred to the more pejorative term
41 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 115 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
42 See Brian E. Davis, The State Giveth and the Court Taketh Away: Preserving the Munic-
ipality’s Ability to Zone for Group Homes Under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,
59 U. PITT. L. REV. 193, 210 (1997).
43 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01 (LexisNexis 2015).
44 Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801–819, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (1994)).
45 H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 2 (1988).
46 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1)–(3) (2006).
47 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (emphasis in original).
48 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(b) (2012).
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“handicap” (part of why the Americans with Disabilities Act employed
term disability, rather than handicap),49 this Article employs the lexical
unit disability to refer to what the FHAA defines as a handicap.
2. The Integrated Enterprise’s Application to the Municipality
Lacks FHAA Coverage
a. The Integrated Enterprise Cannot Be Disabled or Possess
an Impairment
Under the FHAA, a “person” admittedly includes corporate per-
sons.50 But logically, a corporation such as the Enterprise cannot be
physically or mentally impaired or disabled. Even assuming the applying
LLC is the sole party in interest, the FHAA does not list LLCs as persons,
and meaningful distinctions exist between corporations and LLCs,51 in-
cluding numerous corporate requirements to adhere to formalities that do
not apply to LLCs.52 Regardless, neither an LLC nor a corporate person
can possess (i) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
a major life activity or (ii) a disability. And a corporation or an LLC cannot
have a record of or be regarded as having such an impairment. As a result,
49 Id.
50 § 3602(d).
51 See, e.g, Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging
Entity, 47 BUS. LAW. 375, 424 (1992) (noting the IRS “will treat an unincorporated organi-
zation, such as an LLC, as a corporation for tax purposes [only] if it has more corporate
than noncorporate characteristics,” including, “(1) associates, (2) an objective to carry on
business and divide the gains, (3) continuity of life, (4) free transferability of interests,
(5) centralization of management, and (6) limited liability”); Stone v. Jetmar Props., LLC,
733 N.W.2d 480, 486 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (blending partnership law and corporate law
to determine whether LLC formation had occurred) (quoting 14 RICHARD R. POWELL,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 81A.04(1)(a)(iii) (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2006) (“[M]any,
but not all, courts have denied validity to deeds conveying property to corporations which
are not incorporated at the time of conveyance”)); Gottsacker v. Monnier, 697 N.W.2d 436,
440 (Wis. 2005) (synthesizing corporate and partnership law to determine LLC manage-
ment rights); NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc’ns, LLC, 537 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir.
2008) (mixing corporate and partnership law to determine LLC rights relative to limited
liability protection); Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1213 (Del.
2012) (reviewing both corporate and partnership law to determine LLC fiduciary duties);
D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, PROBLEMS,
AND CASE STUDIES 97–140 (Aspen 3d ed. 2012) (explaining each of the above cases in
greater detail).
52 SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 51, at 93.
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OFH Properties, LLC, as the new owner of the subject property, cannot
constitute a disabled person for purposes of the FHAA. Perhaps to many
readers’ surprise, neither can the potential people articulated as the alleged
revenue drivers of the Applicant referenced by the Integrated Enterprise
in its submitted materials to Montgomery on the Applicant’s behalf.53
b. The Application’s Specific Terms Facially Preclude
FHAA Coverage
Although the Application must fail in obtaining FHAA protection
for multiple statute-specific reasons discussed throughout Part II, this
subsection articulates three unrelated reasons why the case study’s sub-
ject Application must fail and provides guidance for future parties who
may consider seeking CUPs or other zoning variances. Before advancing
those reasons, however, this Article emphasizes the need for potential
applicants seeking a zoning variance based on purported disabilities to
ensure that the purported disabilities listed in the zoning variance ap-
plication actually exist—particularly when professing to be experts in
those disabilities.54
1) The DSM-5
Specifically, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders, Fifth Edition, (“DSM-5”) serves as the authority that health profes-
sionals and researchers employ to diagnose mental disorders.55 Further,
53 See infra Part V.C.
54 See supra text accompanying notes 9–14 (claiming that the public face of the Integrated
Enterprise’s Applicant division is an expert in Alzheimer’s and dementia).
55 Rheana Murray, DSM-5, the New Mental Illness ‘Bible,’ May List Internet Addiction
Among Illnesses, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 11, 2012, 4:06 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com
/life-style/health/dsm-5-new-mental-illness-bible-list-internet-addiction-illnesses-article-1
.1020979, archived at http://perma.cc/G3Z8-CLK3 (indicating that the DSM is “widely
considered the ‘bible’ of psychiatric symptoms in the mental-health industry”). The Amer-
ican Psychological Association indicates that:
DSM-5 is the handbook used by health care professionals in the United
States and much of the world as the authoritative guide to the diagnosis
of mental disorders. Clinicians use DSM-5 diagnoses to communicate
with their patients and with other clinicians, and to request reimburse-
ment from insurance organizations. DSM-5 diagnoses may also be used
by public health authorities for compiling and reporting morbidity and
mortality statistics. Another important role of DSM is to establish diag-
noses for research on mental disorders. Only by having consistent and
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from a business standpoint, the DSM-5’s diagnostic codes serve as the
basis from which individual health providers56 and hospitals57 receive
payment from health insurers, including government insurers such as
Massachusetts’s “Romneycare,”58 the United States’s “Obamacare,”59 and
reliable diagnoses can researchers determine the risk factors and causes
for specific disorders, and determine their incidence and prevalence rates.
Insurance Implications of DSM-5, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (2013), available at http://www
.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Practice/DSM/DSM-5/Insurance-Implications-of-DSM
-5.pdf (emphasis added).
56 Id. Rhetorically inquiring, “Can clinicians continue to use the DSM-IV-TR diagnostic
criteria?”, and responding that:
[T]here may be brief delays while insurance companies update their
claim forms and reporting procedures to accommodate DSM-5 changes,
and clinicians should use DSM-IV-TR diagnoses and codes when required
by a specific company. . . . [However], [t]he APA [American Psychiatric
Association] is working with these groups with the expectation that a tran-
sition to DSM-5 by the insurance industry can be made by December 31,
2013. As part of the transition to DSM-5, there will also need to be updates
of questions in board certification examinations and quality assessments
for medical record reviews. APA will be providing periodic updates of
agreements with federal agencies, private insurance companies, and
medical examination boards as they become available.
Id.
57 See Jay Neugeboren, The Consolation of a Psych Diagnosis, THE ATLANTIC (May 8, 2013,
12:47 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/05/the-consolation-of-a-psych
-diagnosis/275608/, archived at http://perma.cc/NY2S-3DW8 (asserting that the DSM’s
influence “cannot be overestimated: its diagnostic categories are required for private
insurance reimbursement, government payments for mental health treatment, and for
public and private research funding. It serves as the basis of psychiatric law for our court
systems, regulatory agencies, schools, social services, prisons, juvenile detention facilities,
and drug companies” ). This article quotes Frank Putnam, a professor of child psychiatry
at Children’s Hospital Medical Center in Cincinnati, who states:
“You need a diagnosis to bill—that’s the way the world works. Most of the
interventions we do at my center aren’t billable—we lose $220 for every kid
we see. You can’t just treat somebody without giving a formal diagnosis,”
and as a result, “the DSM has become the tail that wags the dog.” In
addition, without an official diagnosis, there’s no money for research, since
you can’t, for example, go to the National Institute of Mental Health and
ask to be funded for a non-existent disease.
Id.; see also Top-Ranked Pediatric Hospitals for Cancer, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://
health.usnews.com/best-hospitals/pediatric-rankings, archived at http://perma.cc/PUE7
-W82C (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (ranking Cincinnati’s Children’s Hospital number one
among the top-ranked pediatric hospitals for cancer).
58 See, e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 55, at 4.
59 See, e.g., Michael Dhar, As DSM-5 Launches, the Drama Ends and the Effects Begin, THE
FIX (May 21, 2013), http://www.thefix.com/content/dsm-5-diagnosis-mental-health-addiction
-controversy8434?page=all, archived at http://perma.cc/BZM8-6UT7 (“The DSM-5 revisions
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certain international universal healthcare systems.60 In fairness, however,
this Article acknowledges its author’s previously published personal dis-
agreements with the DSM’s historic maltreatment of individuals pos-
sessing certain traits.61 The discomfort with the DSM has been the DSM’s
over-inclusiveness, not its under-inclusiveness. And even authors who
have vigorously disagreed with those previously published personal dis-
agreements share this concern.62 This unease particularly exists in light of
the mounting evidence that large pharmaceutical companies engage in med-
icalization63 and disease mongering.64 These tactics involve pharmaceutical
were based on the same healthcare research that shaped Obamacare, and will work in tan-
dem with the legislation to encourage early intervention in substance use disorders,” ac-
cording to Charles O’Brien, M.D., Ph.D., who serves as the leader of “the University of
Pennsylvania’s Center for Studies in Addiction and chair of the DSM-5’s Substance-Related
Disorders Work Group”).
60 See, e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 55, at 2–3.
61 See David Groshoff, The Wrong Track, Baby—How Damage to Gay Youth was Borne This
Way: Via Ideologically Bound Law Reviews Publishing “Hopey Changey Stuff,” 18 CARDOZO
J. L. & GENDER 275, 281–86, 314 n.245 (2012) (attacking previous editions of the DSM
for their notorious created mental disorders applicable to individuals in the LGBTQIA
community).
62 Compare LEONARD SAX, WHY GENDER MATTERS: WHAT PARENTS AND TEACHERS NEED TO
KNOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES 9 (Doubleday 2005) (advo-
cating strongly for sex-segregated education); LEONARD SAX, BOYS ADRIFT: THE FIVE FACTORS
DRIVING THE GROWING EPIDEMIC OF UNMOTIVATED BOYS AND UNDERACHIEVING YOUNG
MEN 22 (Basic Books 2007) (same); Leonard Sax, Reclaiming Kindergarten: Making Kinder-
garten Less Harmful to Boys, 2 PSYCH. OF MEN & MASC. 3, 9–11 (2001) (same); with David
Groshoff, Unchartered Territory: Market Competition’s Constitutional Collision with Entre-
preneurial Sex-Segregated Charter Schools, 2010 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 307, 356–57 (2010)
(indicating strong support for charter schools as a form of social entrepreneurship but
vigorously opposing sex-segregated publicly funded charter schools based on analysis of
more recently reliable published data, in addition to a detailed analysis of statutory, leg-
islative, and administrative history contextualizing the Court’s guidance on the matter).
Cf. Leonard Sax, Opinion, ‘Unspecified Mental Disorder’? That’s Crazy, WALL ST. J., June 27,
2013, at A21 (stating, that the DSM-5 “loosens the rules [for obtaining a psychiatric
diagnosis] in a disturbing way” because, for example, “[t]he DSM-5 offers a completely new
diagnostic category ‘Unspecified Mental Disorder’ . . . . The only requirement is that you
‘do not meet the full criteria for any mental disorder’ ”).
63 See Shankar P. R. & Subish P., Disease Mongering, 48 SINGAPORE MED. J. 275, 275–77
(2007). This article provides a global case study, asserting that:
Convincing healthy people that they are sick and in need of medicines
creates an enormous market for drugs and medicines. Medicalisation is
the process of turning ordinary life events and its customary ups and
downs into medical conditions . . . Disease mongering can turn ordinary
ailments into medical problems, see mild symptoms as serious, treat
personal problems as medical ones, see risks as diseases, and frame
prevalence estimates to increase potential markets . . . The industry has
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companies’ inventing and branding disorders65 with a goal of marketing66
their respective patented prescription drugs,67 which will simultaneously
learnt to influence the prescribing behaviour of doctors indirectly and to
use “opinion leaders” from the medical profession to promote their prod-
ucts. “Illness promotion” involves using public awareness campaigns in
the media to encourage people to seek new treatments, and ensuring
support to patient-help organisations. “Disease awareness” campaigns
are linked to the marketing strategies of drug companies. Companies
fund and facilitate disease awareness campaigns and consumer groups
using their public relation and marketing departments. The media is
targeted with stories and reports which create a fear about a disease or
a particular condition and highlight the latest treatment . . . Disease
mongering can generate huge profits for the industry.
Id.
64 See, e.g., Ray Moynihan & David Henry, The Fight Against Disease Mongering: Generating
Knowledge for Action, 3 PloS MED. 425, 425 (2006). This article argues that:
[D]isease mongering is the selling of sickness that widens the boundaries
of illness and grows the markets for those who sell and deliver treat-
ments. It is exemplified most explicitly by many pharmaceutical industry-
funded disease-awareness campaigns—more often designed to sell drugs
than to illuminate or to inform or educate about the prevention of illness
or the maintenance of health.
Id.
65 See Vince Parry, The Art of Branding a Condition, MED. MKTING. & MEDIA, May 2003,
at 46, 49, available at https://sdsuwriting.pbworks.com/f/Parry+art+of+branding+a+condi
tion.pdf (demonstrating how marketing on behalf of pharmaceutical clients fosters the crea-
tion of new disorders, including mental disorders, such as “Xanax” and “panic disorders”);
cf. Not ‘Crazy Cat Ladies’: Hoarding Gets New Diagnosis, NBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2012, 12:46 PM),
http://vitals.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/12/08/15757938-not-crazy-cat-ladies-hoarding-gets
-new-diagnosis, archived at http://perma.cc/2J42-XAN5 (indicating that on the heels of
reality television successes regarding programming observing peoples’ hoarding behaviors,
the DSM-5 now recognizes a new disorder). Distinct from the prior diagnosis of “obsessive-
compulsive disorder,” Mapes’s article describes the specifically named “hoarding disorder”:
The revised diagnosis should “result in more people having access to treat-
ment,” says Randy Frost, a professor of psychology at Smith College . . .
[“]Once it shows up in DSM, there will be much more pressure on clinicians
to train in how to treat this problem” . . . [F]rost stresses there is no
“magic pili” [sic] . . . We don’t know yet whether there are medications
that might be useful for this,” he says. “But that’s one of the things that will
happen now that it’s in the DSM. There will be an interest in researching
this.” Until then, hoarders can get help overcoming their urge to acquire
and save through cognitive behavior therapy.
Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the national news organization is implicitly acknowl-
edging that a pill will arrive now that the DSM diagnosis has been created.
66 See Parry, supra note 65.
67 See, e.g., RAY MOYNIHAN & ALAN CASSELS, SELLING SICKNESS: HOW THE WORLD’S BIGGEST
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES ARE TURNING US ALL INTO PATIENTS ix (Nation Books 2005)
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(i) drive material revenue growth; and (ii) mask marketing as pharmaceuti-
cal research and development (“R&D”),68 which will (a) increase the firms’
interest tax shields,69 (b) lead to greater real cash flows,70 and (c) exploit
“accounting gimmickry”71 that collectively result in skewed net income
derived figures used by investors,72 leading to an increased likelihood of
a strong share price in the market.73
Despite its quirks, however, the DSM-5 unquestionably sets the
standards for what diagnoses legitimately exist for healthcare providers and
researchers to employ. Unfortunately, this schema may cause considerable
problems for zoning variance applicants seeking AHFs. First, although
(asserting that “[t]he marketing strategies of the world’s biggest drug companies now aggres-
sively target the healthy and the well. The ups and downs of daily life have become mental
disorders, common complaints are transformed into frightening conditions, and more and
more ordinary people are turned into patients [by using] promotional campaigns that exploit
our deepest fears”).
68 See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 156–72 (Random House 2004) (revealing what the author
witnessed during her time as the Editor-in-Chief of the New England Journal of Medicine).
69 See generally Pablo Fernández, Valuing Companies by Cash Flow Discounting: Ten Methods
and Nine Theories (Univ. of Navarra, IESE Bus. Sch., Univ. of Navarra, Working Paper
451, Rev. 2006), available at http://www.iese.edu/research/pdfs/di-0451-e.pdf (explaining
that all ten discounted cash flow methodologies arrived at the same value, but differences
arose when debt and associated interest tax shields occurred); but see generally Pablo
Fernández, The Value of Tax Shields is NOT Equal to the Present Value of Tax Shields, 73 J.
FIN. ECON. 145 (2004) (alerting the reader that tax shields’ value is not necessarily their
value discounted to the present).
70 Many ways exist to measure cash flow, given the readership of legal scholarship in law
journals, this author employs the relatively simple “Earnings Before Interest Taxes, De-
preciation, and Amortization” (“EBITDA”) as a proxy for cash flow. See, e.g., David Groshoff,
Would “Junkholder Primacy” Reduce Junk Corporate Governance?, 13 J. BUS. & SEC. L.
59, 90–91 (2012); David Groshoff, Creatively Financed Legal Education in a Marketized
Environment: How Faculty Leveraged Buyouts Can Maximize Law Schools’ Stakeholder
Values, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 387, 439–41 (2012).
71 See, e.g., Walter P. Schuetze, What Are Assets and Liabilities? Where Is True North?
(Accounting That My Sister Would Understand), 37 ABACUS 1, 23 (2001) (“Earnings man-
agement is a scourge in the U.S.A. Earnings management is the ultimate in accounting
gimmickry”).
72 For example, the denominator in a Price/Earnings ratio, commonly used by investors
including Warren Buffet, is based on accounting rules. While sophisticated financiers such
as Buffet may understand how to undo the accounting gimmickry, many individual inves-
tors may not. See, e.g., Stephen H. Penman, The Articulation of Price-Earnings Ratios and
Market-to-Book Ratios and the Evaluation of Growth, 34 J. ACCT. RES. 235, 235–36 (1996).
73 Cf. supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the corporate primary objective
to maximize shareholder value).
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the Application seeks a home for persons with “Alzheimer’s or dementia,”74
dementia no longer constitutes a recognized disorder under the DSM-5.
Second, a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s occurs only post-mortem. Third, the
Applicant, Enterprise, or both appear to violate the FHAA by simulta-
neously seeking to cloak themselves in the FHAA’s protections while truly
acting in furtherance of the Integrated Enterprise’s other commercial real
estate business activities.75
2) Dementia Is No Longer a Recognized Mental Disorder Under
the DSM
Per the prior Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
the Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR),76 Alzheimer’s was con-
sidered a particular form of dementia that required a diagnosis of dementia
as a condition precedent to a diagnosis of possible or probable Alzheimer’s
(generally known as possible or probable “Dementia of the Alzheimer’s
Type” or “DAT”).77 However, those diagnoses no longer occur, and were no
longer possible at the time that the Applicant submitted its Application to
the municipality.
The public knew the removal of dementia from DSM-5’s list of
mental disorders was in the works for many years before the American
Psychiatric Association published its removal, with advance notice of its
contents and release date, on May 18, 2013.78 Although neurocognitive
disorders or other diagnoses may subsume what was once diagnosed as
dementia,79 dementia nonetheless no longer represents a recognized mental
74 The Application, supra note 4.
75 See discussion infra Part V.B.
76 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
154 (4th ed. 2000). This manual is commonly referred to as DSM-IV-TR).
77 Id.; see also PETER J. WHITEHOUSE & DANIEL GEORGE, THE MYTH OF ALZHEIMER’S: WHAT
YOU AREN’T BEING TOLD ABOUT TODAY’S MOST DREADED DIAGNOSIS 103 (2008) (arguing
that the Alzheimer’s disease is a social construct that simply represents the “medicalization
of brain aging”). The DSM-5 was just published in May 2013, and people and practitioners
are still digesting the changes from the DSM-IV-TR.
78 See, e.g., Marguerite Mantao-Rao, Will New DSM-5 Diagnosis End ‘Dementia’ Stigma?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 5, 2012, 5:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marguerite
-manteaurao/dsm-dementia_b_1404224.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NJU6-GENV;
see also supra notes 55–56 (indicating in advance notice to various constituencies of what
would appear in the DSM-5, well before its official release); Highlights of Changes From
DSM-IV-TR to DSM-5, AM. PSYCHIATRIC PUBL’G at 16–17 (2003).
79 See supra note 62 (indicating that nearly anything can now receive a diagnosis as a
mental disorder under the DSM-5’s catchall provisions).
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disorder. As a result, the public fact of the Integrated Enterprise’s—Our
Family Home80—specifically indicated on its Application a desired purpose
“to operate an Adult Family Home for up to five Alzheimer’s and/or demen-
tia patients at the existing single family house.”81 Yet the municipality
received the submitted Application subsequent to the DSM-5 having re-
moved dementia as a disorder.82
The Application, per its own terms, cannot lead to future potential
residents receiving a dementia diagnosis because that diagnosis no longer
exists. If approved, a CUP application from a company which, by its own
free will, affirmatively and intentionally limited itself to operating an AHF
for residents on the basis of two mental conditions, one of which is no
longer a recognized mental disorder and the other can only be diagnosed
post-mortem, would ultimately lead to an empty residence. In addition,
a rejection of such an application could not lead to any legitimate claims of
discrimination against persons who have a record of any impairment or
are regarded as having such impairment because the municipality’s decision
to deny such an application would be made with the knowledge that the
specifically alleged impairment does not constitute a legitimate diagnosis.
3) Alzheimer’s Diagnoses Can Occur Only Post-Mortem
Beyond the need of potential AHF applicants to ensure their
application lists an existing diagnosable condition when it submits a zon-
ing variance to a municipality, potential applicants must also ensure that
they understand the scientific basis of when and how any listed recognized-
diagnosable condition can occur. For example, the alleged experts in Alz-
heimer’s who authorized the case study’s Application chose to employ
the specific term “Alzheimer’s,” not “Probable Alzheimer’s” or “Possible
Alzheimer’s.”83 These distinctions result in consequential differences.
For decades, it has been a scientific fact that verifiable diagnoses
of Alzheimer’s can occur only after death. This consistent scientific fact has
remained unchanged from the initial peer-reviewed scientific publications
80 See supra notes 10–14 (discussing the CEO of Our Family Home).
81 Notice of Public Hearing, supra note 6.
82 Guy McKhann et al., Clinical Diagnosis of Alzheimer’s Disease: Report of the NINCDS-
ADRDA Work Group Under the Auspices of Department of Health and Human Services Task
Force on Alzheimer’s Disease, 34 NEUROLOGY 939, 940 (1984), available at http://www
.neurology.org/content/34/7/939.full.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9AY7-GZGR.
83 Id.
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regarding Alzheimer’s in 1984 through the interim, per the National Insti-
tute on Aging,84 to internationally peer-reviewed scientific journals pub-
lished as recently as Spring 2013.85 Further, according to PubMed, the
resource library for the National Center for Biotechnology Information and
a division of the National Library of Medicine at the National Institutes
of Health, “[t]he only way to formally confirm a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s
is by the presence of plaques in the brain in a post-mortem after the pa-
tient has died.”86
The inability to ascribe an Alzheimer’s diagnosis to individuals
during their lifetime is similar to the popular media stories in 2013 re-
garding the brain trauma potentially impacting former National Football
League (“NFL”) players. For example, former San Diego Chargers Run-
ning Back Ronney Jenkins took many hits to the head during his playing
career in the NFL.87 Based on his symptoms, Jenkins believes that he
suffers from chronic traumatic encephalopathy (“CTE”)—the same diag-
nosis applied to Jenkins’s fellow-former Chargers teammate, star line-
backer Junior Seau, who committed suicide in 2012 by shooting himself.88
Despite Jenkins’s belief that his symptoms reflect CTE, “he will never be
sure [because] [t]he only way to diagnose CTE is after death—by analyzing
brain tissue and finding microscopic clumps of an abnormal protein called
tau.”89 Boston University School of Medicine’s Professor and co-founder
of the Center for the Study of Traumatic Encephalopathy Robert Stern
84 See, e.g., McKhann et al., supra note 82, at 940–41 (indicating that diagnosis of Alzheimer’s
occurs post-mortem); see also Alzheimer’s Disease: Fact Sheet, ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE EDUC.
& REFERRAL CENT. (July 2011), http://www.nia.nih.gov/sites/default/files/alzheimers
_disease_fact_sheet_0.pdf (“Alzheimer’s can be definitively diagnosed only after death by
linking clinical measures with an examination of brain tissue and pathology in an autopsy.”).
85 See Lydia C. B. Fletcher et al., Diagnosing Alzheimer’s Disease: Are We Any Nearer to Useful
Biomarker-based Non-invasive Tests?, 9 GMS HEALTH TECH. ASSESS. 1, 2 (2013), avail-
able at http://www.egms.de/static/pdf/journals/hta/2013-9/hta000107.pdf “A definitive diag-
nosis of Alzheimer’s disease can be made only through autopsy after death, by linking
clinical measures with an examination of brain tissue.”).
86 See Details lacking on ‘new Alzheimer’s test’, PUBMED HEALTH (Apr. 16, 2012, 3:33 PM),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/behindtheheadlines/news/2012-04-16-details
-lacking-on-new-alzheimers-test/, archived at http://perma.cc/C8WD-DE4G (emphasis added).
87 Stephanie Smith, Study Offers Clues about How Athletes’ Brain Disease Begins, CNN
(Aug. 22, 2013, 7:57 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/21/health/cte-study-ronney-jenkins/,
archived at http://perma.cc/SJQ8-QUUD.
88 Nadia Kounang & Stephanie Smith, Seau Had Brain Disease that Comes From Hits to
Head, NIH Finds, CNN (Jan. 11, 2013, 10:18 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/10/health
/seau-brain-disease/index.html, archived at http://perma.cc/UX5P-2JXE.
89 Smith, supra note 87.
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indicated that a problem exists when people clinically diagnose CTE
because “[t]here is no framework to make that diagnosis while someone
is alive.”90
In this case study, based on appearance of the Applicant being a
self-professed expert in Alzheimer’s,91 it is reasonable to believe the Ap-
plicant knew that the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s can only occur post-mortem
and questioned why such a term would be used in an application submitted
to a municipality.92 Because “CTE can result in Alzheimer’s-like symptoms
such as dementia, memory loss, aggression and depression,”93 the distinc-
tion between symptoms that can indicate either CTE or Alzheimer’s (and
a confirming diagnosis of which disorder manifested the symptoms) repre-
sents a meaningful difference for that person, his friends, family, healthcare
professionals, researchers, and here, the law.94 Based on the specific Ap-
plication language on which the municipality or court must evaluate the
Application,95 no one with an Alzheimer’s diagnosis could live at the sub-
ject property in this case study. Additionally, the rejection of such a flawed
application could not lead to any legitimate claims of discriminating against
persons who have a record of, or are regarded as having, any impairment
because only a deceased individual can be diagnosed with Alzheimer’s.
90 Id.
91 See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text (discussing the CEO of Our Family Homes).
92 Underscoring this fact’s particular relevance is the purported founder of Our Family
Home’s alleged status as a “National Alzheimer’s Ambassador” and “a trained speaker of
the local Alzheimer’s Speakers Bureau, which goes out into the community to educate small
and large organizations about Alzheimer’s disease.” Founder, OUR FAMILY HOME, http://www
.ourfamilyhomeinc.com/founder.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5B2B-2WEB (last
visited Mar. 15, 2015) (excepting that the language is phrased in a way that questions
whether the organization or the CEO actually communicates to the public on Alzheimer’s
related matters).
93 Kounang & Smith, supra note 88 (emphasis added).
94 See Robert A. Stern et al., Clinical Presentation of Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy,
81 NEUROLOGY 1122, 1124–27 (2013), available at http://www.bu.edu/cte/files/2013/09
/CTE-Neurology-2013-Stern-1122-9.pdf (indicating that a genetic link appears to exist with
recovery and cognition in CTE, because the study subjects who lacked CTE represented
a smaller population than CTE subjects relative to possessing the APOE Gene).
95 In early August 2013, the municipality that was the subject of this case study became
so confused with the situation, that the municipality filed an action seeking a declaratory
judgment on the matter from state court. Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 2, City of
Montgomery v. Our Family Home, Inc., No. A1305315 (Hamilton Cnty. of Common Pleas
Ct. Aug. 30, 2013), ECF No. [hereinafter the Complaint] (“Defendants, through one entity
or another which is unclear, have submitted the June 7, 2013 application to Montgomery
for the approval of an Adult Family Home to house up to five (5) unrelated resident indi-
viduals suffering from Alzheimer’s or dementia.”).
2015] PRETEXTUALLY PROFITEERING SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS 679
4) Synthesis
Therefore, by applying the undisputed published and peer-reviewed
scientific reality to the facts of the case study, it is evident that: (1) demen-
tia is not a recognized mental disorder diagnosable under the DSM-5, and
dementia represents the diagnosable condition included in the Application
which was filed following the adoption of the DSM-5 by supposed experts
in treating persons with these alleged conditions; and (2) a confirmed diag-
nosis of Alzheimer’s cannot occur until after an individual diagnosed with
probable or possible Alzheimer’s has died. As a result, an applicant seek-
ing a zoning variation or a CUP should be wary of submitting such an
application on the basis of narrowly tailored and specifically alleged dis-
orders or impairments for which living people cannot receive a diagnosis.
Without such a diagnosis, discrimination under the FHAA is moot since
facially the application must fail of its own merits.
Conversely, in the face of threats by a large and apparently well-
capitalized integrated corporate enterprise, no small municipality should
simply believe that the municipality must accept a zoning variance or CUP
application or else face an inevitable losing legal battle. Should a future
zoning variance or CUP applicant wish to avail itself of the FHAA’s protec-
tions, then that applicant ought to apply the broad definitions and descrip-
tions of disabilities articulated and available under the FHAA and the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder and supported by the almost
limitless possibilities abounding in the DSM-596—excepting, of course,
Alzheimer’s and dementia. In this Article’s case study, had the Applicant
chosen that route, the Applicant likely would have avoided not only these
legal problems but also additional legal and policy problems.97
III. APPLICANTS SHOULD EMPLOY CAUTION NOT TO VIOLATE THE
FHAA’S POLICIES AND COME BEFORE A COURT OR TRIBUNAL
WITH UNCLEAN HANDS
By refusing to accept federal funding, an applicant may cleverly
attempt to avoid certain requirements of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973,98 which prohibits disability-based discrimination in federally
96 See supra notes 56, 62 (describing the DSM-5's catch-all provision).
97 See infra Part IV.
98 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791–96(i) (1988). Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One’s Own: The Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and Housing Discrimination Against People with Mental
Disabilities, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 925, 940 (1994) (“To bring a successful claim under section
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funded programs or activities. However, while the FHAA may not apply
to the case study’s municipality,99 the FHAA may apply to applicants such
as the Integrated Enterprise100 whose applications are overly specific. This
assertion exists because “it is unlawful to refuse to rent or sell to a person
who has a record of being disabled or who is perceived as being disabled.”101
Regardless of the ADA, however:
[T]he Fair Housing Act’s no-inquiry regulation . . . prohibits
a housing provider from inquiring into a handicap of an ap-
plicant for tenancy. Courts have ruled consistently that the
Fair Housing Act (FHA) applies to nursing homes, assisted
living facilities, and other long-term care facilities, because
each of these facilities is considered a “dwelling” under
the FHA.102
Thus, as a matter of basic public policy, a zoning variance or CUP applicant
should not be permitted to pick and choose which disabled persons the ap-
plicant admits to an AHF. The case study’s Application, by its very word-
ing, discriminates against all disabled persons, except for living natural
persons with the impossible diagnoses of dementia, Alzheimer’s, or both.
Moreover, courts have held that simply requesting a description of an
individual’s disability exceeds the scope of permissible inquiry.103
504, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the challenged program or activity receives federal
financial assistance; (2) she or he is an ‘individual with handicaps’ under the Act; (3) she
or he is ‘otherwise qualified’ for that specific program or activity; and (4) she or he was ex-
cluded from the program solely on the ground of her or his handicap.” ); see generally Wagner
v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002 (3d Cir. 1995) (indicating that a nursing home
wanting to serve persons with one group of disabilities or disorders violated antidiscrim-
ination laws by refusing to admit an applicant with a different diagnosed disorder). This
Author lacks information as to whether any federal funding has been received by the greater
Integrated Enterprise. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)–(b) (2006) (requiring federal funding
as a condition precedent to an antidiscrimination claim), with the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (ADA), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006) (lacking any federal funding condition to
bring a disability-based discrimination claim in a place of public accommodation).
99 See supra Part II.B.2.
100 This Article specifically refers to the LLC entity here, but given the questionable nature
and scope of the Integrated Enterprise, a municipality should seek to determine whether
the greater enterprise has received federal funding. See the Complaint, supra note 95
(describing the complaint for declaratory relief).
101 Kanter, supra note 98, at 947.
102 Eric M. Carlson, Disability Discrimination in Long-Term Care: Using the Fair Housing
Act to Prevent Illegal Screening in Admissions to Nursing Homes and Assisted Living Facil-
ities, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 363, 364 (2007).
103 Robards v. Cotton Mill Assocs., 677 A.2d 540, 544 (Me. 1996).
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Furthermore, a municipality’s approval of such an application may
impose unnecessary risk management on the municipality. For example,
by agreeing to such a CUP application, a municipality would wrongly place
its imprimatur on the very discrimination that the FHAA seeks to avoid.104
As a result, such a municipality would open itself to facing legitimate FHAA
discrimination charges by third parties for approving a zoning variance
or CUP application that permits explicit discriminatory and segregation-
based admissions policies to AHFs. Considering the studies evidencing
that people suffering from a given disability do not fare better when housed
with other people suffering from the same disability,105 coupled with the
fact that integration was a major policy rationale underlying the FHAA, re-
gardless of its motives, an AHF-based applicant should not discriminate
against certain types of disabilities when making admission decisions.
Put simply, no single alleged disability should be entitled to preference or
discriminatory admissions treatment over another disability.106
Relative to discriminatory admissions procedures, the Court’s guid-
ance in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1107 is instructive to municipalities and other tribunals when consid-
ering zoning-variance or CUP applications that include a stated purpose of
explicit admissions-based discrimination on the specific basis of a poten-
tial resident’s disability.108 To paraphrase Chief Justice Roberts, in discrim-
inatory admissions practices perhaps “the way to stop discrimination” in
disability-based admissions “is to stop discriminating” on that very basis.109
A. Assuming Application of Law to Scientific Fact Does Not
Govern the Case Study
While Chief Justice Roberts and the Court ultimately interpret the
law, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is one step below the Supreme Court
104 See 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006).
105 See Stephen J. Taylor et al., The Nonrestrictive Environment: A Resource Manual on
Community Integration for People with the Most Severe Disabilities 49–50 (Jan. 1986)
(Ctr. of Human Pol’y 1986); 2 JULIE ANN RACINO ET AL., HOUSING, SUPPORT AND COMMUNITY:
CHOICES AND STRATEGIES FOR ADULTS WITH DISABILITIES 357, 361 (1993).
106 See, e.g., Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg.
3232, 3245 (1989) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (1997)).
107  551 U.S. 701 (2007).
108 For a detailed discussion of this admissions-based discrimination as applied to a case
study in the educational entrepreneurship setting, see Groshoff, Unchartered Territory,
supra note 2, at 342–44.
109 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 748.
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and is the controlling federal appellate court for all of Ohio, Michigan,
Kentucky, and Tennessee,110 the jurisdiction of the case study and locus
of very recent declaratory relief action. In agreement, the Seventh Circuit
cogently proclaimed: “[N]ot every refusal to grant a conditional use permit,
even if the request is reasonable, violates the FHAA.”111 Keeping this ad-
monition in mind and applying it to the case study, the Integrated Enter-
prise, as a corporation, may constitute an “aggrieved person” under the
FHAA but the Applicant, as a limited liability company, may not.112
Nonetheless, the FHAA defines an “aggrieved person” as “any
person who (1) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing
practice; or (2) believes that such person will be injured by a discrimina-
tory housing practice that is about to occur.”113 However, several condi-
tions exist before any potential aggrieved person may assert an alleged
discriminatory housing practice under the FHAA. Specifically, the FHAA
requires a violation of either: (i) § 3604; (ii) § 3605; (iii) § 3606; or
(iv) § 3617.114 Reviewing each of these provisions in turn demonstrates
that in a situation similar to the subject case study, a municipality’s
rejection of a zoning-variance or CUP-based AHF application does not
give rise to a legitimate FHAA violation.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 3604—Direct Threat Safe Harbors and Other
Foreseeable Threats
1. Direct Threat Safe Harbor Exemption
Vital to both federal law and public policy is the FHAA’s safe-
harbor provision.115 The safe-harbor provision states in no uncertain terms
that the FHAA’s protections do apply to persons “whose tenancy would
110 Additional Information on the Court of Appeals, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT, http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/court_of_appeals/courtappeals.htm, archived
at http://perma.cc/2MPF-SYDL (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
111 Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson, 84 F.3d 960, 963 (7th Cir. 1996).
112 The statutory language is unclear, as the FHAA was enacted prior to limited liability
companies gaining popularity and the FHAA is silent as to limited liability companies.
See supra note 51 (detailing judicial analyses of LLCs that employ a mixture of part-
nership law and corporate law to arrive at LLC law and quoting the IRS that an LLC is
not incorporated).
113 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) (2006).
114 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) (2006).
115 Act of Sept. 13, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 804(f)(9), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.)
1622 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) (2006)).
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constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or
whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the property
of others.”116 Buttressing the statutory language, the FHAA’s legislative
history compounds problems for potential applicants who submit applica-
tions that are too narrowly tailored, presumably such as the case study’s
Application. In particular, the FHAA’s legislative history demonstrates
that Congress enacted the safe-harbor provision specifically “to allay the
fears of those who believe that the non-discrimination provisions of this
Act could force . . . [transactions related] to individuals whose tenancies
could pose such a risk” of a direct threat against them.117 This evidences
a policy rationale not to evict a tenant ex-post, following a direct threat,
but instead to assuage concerns ex-ante related to potential direct threats
in the future.
A page on the Applicant’s website as of June 20, 2013,118 applying
the FHAA’s safe harbor provision to the case study, stated that its related
entities’ residents display “difficult behaviors, like aggression, mood swings,
wandering, or sundown[ing].”119 Another webpage describes a resident
116 Id.
117 H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 28 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2189
(emphasis added) (additional views of various members of the House Judiciary Committee
criticizing the breadth of the handicap provisions in the bill that eventually became the
1988 Amendments Act).
118 See Frequently Asked Questions, OUR FAMILY HOME, http://www.ourfamilyhomeinc
.com/faq.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4QFE-2ZF6 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). This
Article refers to “Our Family Home” broadly here, as the website suggests a corporation
by virtue of the “inc.” at the end of the web address, which would be a different entity
under Ohio law in 2006. See Articles of Incorporation for Our Family Home, Inc., STATE
OF OHIO CERTIFICATE (Doc. No. 200608202924), available at http://www2.sos.state
.oh.us/reports/rwservlet?imgc&Din=200608202924, archived at http://perma.cc/MF53
-QN4Q; see also the Complaint, supra note 95 (evidencing confusion by the case study
municipality).
119 Id. Compare Oscar L. Lopez et al., Psychiatric Symptoms Vary with the Severity of
Dementia in Probable Alzheimer’s Disease, 15 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCI.
346, 347 (2003), available at http://neuro.psychiatryonline.org/doi/pdf/10.1176/jnp.15.3.346
(indicating that “sundowning” included delusions as “defined in accordance with the
DSM-IV criteria.”), with D.L. Bliwise et al., Disruptive Nocturnal Behavior in Parkinson’s
Disease and Alzheimer’s Disease, 8 J. GERIATR. PSYCHIATRY& NEUROLOGY 107, 107 (1995)
(evidencing that the authors, members of the Department of Neurology at Emory Uni-
versity’s Medical School, state that the more clinical name for “sundowning” is “disruptive
nocturnal behavior”), and Nina Khachiyants et al., Sundown Syndrome in Persons with
Dementia: An Update, 8 PSYCHIATRY INVESTIG. 276, 277 (2011) (“In general, sundown
syndrome is characterized by the emergence or increment of neuropsychiatric symptoms
such as agitation, confusion, anxiety, and aggressiveness in late afternoon, in the evening,
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with a propensity for being a flight risk via memorizing door codes.120 While
the webpage indicated that the individual eventually was taken off of his
drugs, the webpage never indicated that the individual ever stopped being
a flight risk.121
And the facts do not stop at the anecdotal evidence proffered by the
Our Family Home website. Doctors Dilip V. Jeste and Sanford I. Finkel in-
dicated “a number of groups of researchers have found that delusions and
hallucinations are commonly associated with aggression, agitation, and dis-
ruptive behavior in patients with [Alzheimer’s Disease]” and “[p]sychotic
symptoms are a major cause of caregiver distress.”122 Yet, despite such care-
giver distress, Ohio’s Administrative Code (“OAC”) requires no continu-
ing education and little education for caregivers at ACF-type AHFs.123
Additionally, under the DSM-IV-TR, which governed at the time of the
Article’s publication, the most common dementia was probable or possible
or at night. Sundowning is highly prevalent among individuals with dementia”) (emphasis
added). For a detailed discussion of Sundowning, see also Ladislav Volicer et al., Sun-
downing and Circadian Rhythms in Alzheimer’s Disease, 158 AM. J. PSYCH. 704 (2001).
Sundowning, or sundown syndrome, is a poorly defined entity. Some
investigators even question its existence, pointing out that some patients
are more “agitated” in the morning, some more in the afternoon and
evening, and some equally agitated throughout the whole day. Sun-
downing has been also ascribed to environmental influences, such as
change of shift, or to attempts of confused individuals to leave their units
because they “want to go home from work.”
Id. at 704 (internal citations omitted). But see Avrid Skjerve & Harald A. Nygaard, Case
Report, Improvement in Sundowning in Dementia with Lewy Bodies after Treatment with
Donepezil, 15 INT’L J. GERIATR. PSYCHIATRY 1147, 1147 (2000) (“Sundowning refers to the
recurring onset of confusion or agitation in elderly patients in the evening and can be a
significant clinical problem. In community dwelling patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD),
the phenomenon has been reported to be associated with significant caregiver stress”);
see supra note 65 (describing the pharmaceutical industry’s impact on branding diseases to
sell patented medication). See also GORDON LIGHTFOOT, SUNDOWN (Warner Bros. Records
1975) (“Sundown you better take care/if I find you been creepin’/’round my back stairs . . .
Sometimes I think it’s a shame/when I get feelin’ better/when I’m feelin’ no pain”).
120 Videos, OUR FAMILY HOME, http://www.ourfamilyhomeinc.com/videos.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/W5S2-JDRW (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
121 Cf. Skjerve & Nygaard, supra note 119, at 1147 (suggesting that medication may help
reduce the negative results of disruptive nocturnal behavior).
122 Dilip V. Jeste & Sanford I. Finkel Psychosis of Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Dementias,
8 AM. J. GERIATR. PSYCH. 29, 29 (2000) (citations omitted), available at http://webspace
.psychiatry.wisc.edu/walaszek/geropsych/docs/jeste-psychosis.pdf. The AD diagnoses pre-
sumably occurred post-mortem, given the scientific nature of the publication.
123 See generally OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5122–33 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012) (discussing Adult
Care Facilities).
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Alzheimer’s disease,124 and people suffering from dementia diagnoses could
exhibit at any time a wide number of symptoms that include “behavioral
problems such as wandering . . . emotional outbursts, disruptiveness,
and aggression.”125
Abundant data in scholarly journals details persons suffering from
alleged dementias and Alzheimer’s constitute direct threats to others. For
instance, a 2003 manuscript published in the Indiana Law Journal sug-
gested that a person who makes loud noises on a nightly basis,126 thereby
preventing neighbors from sleeping, would pose a health risk to neighbors;
such conduct constitutes a direct threat under the FHAA’s safe harbor.127
Perhaps saving the best evidence for last, courts have held that alleged dis-
ruptive behaviors that would constitute criminal conduct—even without
conviction—are a “direct threat” for FHAA purposes.128
Further, a municipality that approves an ACF-based CUP appli-
cation on the basis of two alleged impairments that specifically have vio-
lent behaviors associated with them not only acquiesces to particularized
disability-based admission discrimination policies, but also places per-
sons with demonstrated violent propensities—direct threats to the health
or safety (or both) of others, subject to a specific safe-harbor carve out in
the FHAA and its legislative history—inside a residential neighborhood
zoned for single-family use. Applying this general idea to the case study,
a bus stop for a K–12 public-school district apparently has existed at the
corner of the subject property since at least 1977.129 The school district
124 JOHN PARRY, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: A PRIMER 5–6 (5th ed. 1995); see also Lopez et
al., supra note 119, at 346 (employing in its title “probable Alzheimer’s,” rather than
merely “Alzheimer’s”).
125 PARRY, supra note 124, at 5.
126 Jennifer L. Dolak, Note, The FHAA’s Reasonable Accommodation & Direct Threat
Provisions as Applied to Disabled Individuals Who Become Disruptive, Abusive, or Destruc-
tive in Their Housing Environment, 36 IND. L. REV. 759, 779 (2003).
127 Id. at 779.
128 See Arnold Murray Constr., LLC v. Hicks, 621 N.W.2d 171, 173, 175 (S.D. 2001); see
generally Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens Apts., 250 F.3d 1039 (6th Cir. 2001); see also
Lapid-Laurel, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442, 445 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating
collectively the same substantial proposition regarding violent threats under the FHAA,
albeit in rental and reasonable accommodation contexts). See Dolak, supra note 126, at
776–77 (stating that “Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens Apartments supports the propo-
sition that the burden is on the resident to propose” a potential solution in such cases).
129 See generally Policy Manual for Sycamore Community School District, OHIO SCH. BDS.
ASS’N, http://z2.ctspublish.com/osba/Z2Browser2.html?showset=sycamore-osba, archived
at http://perma.cc/GU4Q-CU68, (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
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operates in at least four municipalities.130 As a result, the school system is
governed by its own board of education elected by voters in each of the mu-
nicipalities, only one of which is the municipality scrutinized in this case
study.131 Consequently, even if it wanted to, the municipality has neither
the right nor the ability to tell or request the school district to move the bus
stop,132 and the school district has no obligation to do so.133
Thus, material concerns exist in requiring public school children
as young as five years old to be in close proximity to direct threats without
the benefit of having the physical, mental, or social development to defend
themselves. Likewise, the municipality is unable to defend those children
from direct threats without incurring significant financial, human, and
social burdens, such as having municipal police monitor the stop during
busing hours. This situation smacks of failing at least some of government’s
essential functions: protecting residents from physical harm and using
taxpayer money efficiently.
Thus, applied to the case study, even assuming that the Applica-
tion’s two submitted alleged disabilities were to exist as valid diagnoses,
the FHAA would remain unavailable to the Applicant or its Integrated
Enterprise because of the distinctively ascribed aggressive and violent
propensities associated with the two narrowly chosen classes of people and
diagnoses. Again, the takeaway for courts, policymakers, and potential AHF
applicants is that applicants should submit broad, non-discriminatory
130 About us, SYCAMORE CMTY. SCH., http://www.sycamoreschools.org/district/about-us
.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
131 See Policy Manual, supra note 129.
132 A discussion of potential HIPAA violations is beyond this Article’s scope.
133 A logical question arises when this point is raised to third-party reviewers: what is the
nexus between a municipality disclosing this information to a school district and the pri-
vacy protections articulated under HIPAA? Although HIPAA may apply to municipalities
in other limited contexts, HIPAA is wholly inapplicable to the situation this Article
examines. Congress limited the entities subjected to HIPAA’s reach. 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d)
(2006). As a result, municipalities are not covered entities under HIPAA in the instant
context. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2012) (stating that a “covered entity” under HIPPA is “(1) [a]
health plan, (2) [a] health care clearinghouse, [or] (3) [a] health care provider who trans-
mits any health information in electronic form in connection with a transaction” under
which the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) has promulgated
standards); see also Guidance Materials for Consumers, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding /consumers/, archived at http://
perma.cc/4H36-D468 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (“Examples of organizations that do not
have to follow the Privacy and Security Rules include . . . many municipal offices”); see
generally ANDREA I. O’BRIEN, WHAT EVERY MUNICIPALITY SHOULD KNOW ABOUT HIPAA’S
MEDICAL PRIVACY RULES 25 (2003).
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applications that span a wide range of disabilities or disorders which
comport with the FHAA’s protective language, rather than the FHAA’s
safe harbor. Doing so would help prevent potential AHF applicants from
cabining themselves to alleged impairments that present specific diagnoses
of direct threats, particularly as these threats have been broadly inter-
preted by some courts to receive FHAA safe-harbor exclusions. Failing to
submit a broad, nondiscriminatory application appears to remove the ability
of a zoning-variance applicant to avail itself of any relevant protections
under 42 U.S.C. § 3604.134
2. Other Threats
Threats arise not only from the potential of physical harm to existing
residents but also from those existing non-ACF residents. Using a rea-
sonably foreseeable example, existing non-ACF residents could become
defendant tortfeasors by accidentally driving into a wandering AHF tenant
with sundowners syndrome late at night. In the case study, the Application
indicates that wandering is a product of the alleged disabilities. Munici-
palities and tribunals should exercise extreme caution when deliberating
the potential approval of AHF-based CUP applications that place unnec-
essary and potentially significant tort liability on existing non-AHF resi-
dents. More importantly, from a policy standpoint municipalities should
also be cognizant that the Court’s recent decisions in McDonald v. City
of Chicago135 and District of Columbia v. Heller136 strongly underscore
citizens’ Second Amendment rights to use lethal self-help if threatened in
their homes or on their property.
In the case study, the municipality’s voters have elected congres-
sional delegations for decades and have consistently supported represen-
tatives who strongly support the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution.137 As a result, the foreseeability of additional persons owning
134 See generally Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens Apts., 250 F.3d 1039 (6th Cir. 2001), and
Lapid-Laurel, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating
collectively the same substantial proposition regarding violent threats under the FHAA,
albeit in rental and reasonable accommodation contexts). See also Dolak, supra note 126,
at 776–77 (stating that “Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens Apartments supports the prop-
osition that the burden is on the resident to propose” a potential solution in such cases).
135 See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 3025 (2010).
136 See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
137 See generally Republican Elected Officials, MONTGOMERY CNTY. REPUBLICAN PARTY,
http://www.mcohiogop.org/elected-officials.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3QGZ-AYVR
(last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
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or using guns (or both) to defend themselves from a direct threat by an
aggressive, wandering AHF tenant who entered the landowner’s property
is neither unreasonable, nor even constitutionally questionable. As a mat-
ter of public policy however, strong support of the Second Amendment
does not equate to a strong policy desire to make its citizenry reasonably
fear the need to spend its resources to further arm itself or increase the
likelihood of a lethal confrontation by a non-AHF resident fearing the need
to resort to self-help against persons so “out of their mind” as to lack the
requisite intent to commit aggravated trespass for the event leading to the
confrontation. As a result, municipalities and tribunals should be aware of
this setting and recognize that such a real scenario may not be one that the
decision maker necessarily would want to set in motion by approving an
AHF-based zoning variance or CUP application.
C. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 and the Financial Impact of AHFs on
Nearby Properties
However, the applicable definition of “persons” excludes munici-
palities or municipal entities.138 FHAA § 3605(a) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose
business includes engaging in residential real estate-related
transactions to discriminate against any person in making
available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions
of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin.139
The exclusion arises due to § 3602(d)’s reference to trustees in
bankruptcy under Title 11 of the United States Code.140 Title 11 also has
a definition of “municipality,” and by excluding municipalities from both
the general definition in § 3602(d) and the corresponding reference to
Title 11 of the United States Code, little doubt can exist that Congress in-
tended to exclude municipalities from this section.141
Two relevant factors needed to analyze a municipality’s zoning
ordinance and the financial valuation of existing residents’ nest eggs are
138 See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d) (2006).
139 Id. § 3605(a).
140 Id. § 3602(d).
141 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2006) (defining municipality as a “political subdivision or public
agency or instrumentality of a State”).
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located in § 3605. First, § 3605(b) states that appraising residential real
property is a “[r]esidential real estate-related transaction.”142 And second,
§ 3605(c) reads: “Nothing in this subchapter prohibits a person engaged
in the business of furnishing appraisals of real property to take into consid-
eration factors other than race, color, religion, national origin, sex, hand-
icap, or familial status.”143
While corporations may be persons under the law,144 corporate
owners of real property have perpetual lives under default law and thus
have no long-term concerns regarding potential resale value at any par-
ticular moment in life.145 And as Professor Braucher recently wrote, “indi-
viduals do have to sleep at night, and that may be a much stronger enforcer
of their promises than contract law. Corporations do not need sleep or the
moral tranquility that makes it possible.”146
However, individual home and real property owners save for a
lifetime and then often use their home’s value to pay for retirement or
post-retirement care. A real estate appraiser may not consider a person’s
disability in valuing real property and improvements. However, an ap-
praiser may consider associated public information relative to that LLC
in the appraisal, including the extremely odd situation of real estate owned
by a non-real estate investment trust (“REIT”), non-benefit corporation,
non-501(c)(3) not-for-profit corporation, and non-corporate-relocation
entity—i.e., a purely profit-driven LLC. Such an esoteric ownership struc-
ture ought to result in various risk-premium enhancements that result
in discounts to the otherwise intrinsic value of the neighboring real estate
and improvements. Also leading to discounts in property valuation would
include any changes to zoning frontage as well as simply the zoning change
itself that occurs via the CUP being granted in the heart of a residentially
zoned, single family cul-de-sac that lacks adequate space to engage in the
business activities contemplated by the Application.
The financial analysis extends to the case study, and to municipali-
ties and tribunals in particular. The Integrated Enterprise and proponents
142 Id. § 3605(b).
143 Id. § 3605(c).
144 See, e.g., Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 88, 91 (1809) (defining a
corporation as a “person”), overruled in part on other grounds by Louisville, Cincinnati &
Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844) (defining a corporation as a “person”).
145 See PATRICIA H. WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND CORPORATIONS 33 (Prentice-Hall
1985), available at http://www.wirtschaftsethik.ch/upload/werhane-ch1_3.pdf (“In the law
corporations are by and large treated as fictional persons, but unlike ordinary persons they
are granted an unlimited ‘life’ when chartered by state license”).
146 Jean Braucher, The Sacred and Profane Contracts Machine: The Complex Morality of
Contract Law in Action, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 667, 677 (2012).
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of the Application submitted to the municipality and to nearby residents
a memo entitled, “A Representative Sample of the 50+ Studies on the Im-
pacts of Community Residences for People with Disabilities.”147 The memo
asserted two materially misleading claims relative to the financial value of
nearby human-owned real property, which this Article debunks with peer-
reviewed research from prominent authors.
First, the memo claimed “[o]ver [fifty] scientific studies have been
conducted to determine if the presence of a [community residence] . . .
has any effect on property values,”148 and then claimed “[n]o matter which
methodology has been used, every study has concluded that group homes
not clustered on the same block have no effect on property values . . . nor
on . . . parking, traffic, public utilities, nor municipal services.”149 This Ar-
ticle addresses each of these claims. Second, the memo definitively asserted:
“Few studies have been conducted recently simply because this issue is
so well settled that funding for further research is rarely available.”150 This
Article will address the disingenuousness and ethical concerns of these
assertions in detail.
The memo’s initial—and modest—citation is Lauber’s self-authored
and self-published manuscript, a 1986 archeological find, which represents
the most recently dated study in the alleged “50+” scientific studies the
memo references. Every other referenced manuscript in the memo was
authored and published during the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan Ad-
ministrations, with no citations to more recent sources.
Second, the assertion that the memo referenced no recent manu-
scripts on the issue because the “issue is so well settled” and “funding for
further research is rarely available”151 is untrue for two primary reasons:
(a) Those outdated studies—including Lauber’s—have been discredited
by more recent publications and (b) funding for research indeed still exists
for studies.152
Specifically discrediting Lauber’s work, two New York University
(“NYU”) professors, a NYU doctoral fellow, and an economist for the U.S.
147 Memorandum compiled by Daniel Lauber, A Representative Sample of the 50+ Studies
on the Impacts of Community Residences for People With Disabilities, PLANNING/COMMU-
NICATIONS 2 [hereinafter Memo], available at http://www.planningcommunications.com
/gh/bibliography_group_home_impact_studies.pdf.
148 Id. at 1.
149 Id. (emphasis added).
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 See infra note 163 (describing federal research grant funding for the Wharton School’s
research study).
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Department of the Treasury co-authored an article in 2008 indicating that
statistically significant negative changes in property value do occur in
properties located certain distances from such housing in New York City.
In particular, the authors stated: “Results from the majority of these early
studies suggested that such housing does not negatively affect the values
of surrounding homes . . . . The early work suffers from serious method-
ological limitations, however.”153
There exists no meaningful need to review any other earlier study
advanced in the memo because Lauber’s work is debunked by these four
authors in 2008. This is true not only because Lauber’s work was the first-
cited and the most recently authored manuscript in the memo, but also
because the referenced earlier-published and since-discredited work of
Lauber served as the basis for the memo.154
New York City is nothing like the case study’s municipality,
Montgomery, Ohio. Closer to Montgomery than New York City, research-
ers George Galster and Yolanda Williams authored a study in the mid-
1990s that applied data from 741 single-family home sales in Mt. Vernon,
Ohio and 1,649 sales in Newark, Ohio to estimate the impact of homes for
severely disabled adults on neighboring single-family home sales.155 The
authors found “single-family homes within a two-block radius sold for
[forty] percent less than otherwise-comparable homes during the nine
months following the complexes’ opening.”156 In 2000, other researchers
found similar results in DuPage County, Illinois.157 As a result, a number
of more recent and relevant studies exist since 1986 demonstrating that the
financial impact issue did not become settled at that time.158
To further demonstrate that federal funding existed for such studies
well past 1986, federal grant funding backed the 1999 research publication
of three Ph.D.s, including the Chair of the Wharton School’s Real Estate
153 Vicki Been et al., The Impact of Supportive Housing on Surrounding Neighborhoods 3
(N.Y.U. Sch. of L., Furman Ctr. for Real Estate & Urban Pol’y, Working Paper No. 06, 2008),
available at http://www.muni.org/Departments/health/Documents/Furman%20Center
%20Working%20Paper%20on%20the%20Impacts%20of%20Supportive %20Housing.pdf.
154 Compare Memo, supra note 147, with sources cited in infra note 163 and accompanying
text (describing the Wharton study).
155 George Galster & Yolonda Williams, Dwellings for the Severely Mentally Disabled and
Neighborhood Property Values: The Details Matter, 70 LAND ECON. 466, 466, 468 (1994).
156 Id. at 475.
157 See, e.g., Peter F. Colwell et al., The Effect of Group Homes on Neighborhood Property
Values, 76 LAND ECON. 615 (2000).
158 See infra notes 163–65 and accompanying text.
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Department at the University of Pennsylvania.159 The authors indicated
that part of the impetus for their research study was the fact that “the stud-
ies are few in number, are limited in geographic scope, and span four de-
cades, which precludes any general conclusions being drawn from them.”160
In their conclusion, however, the authors stated: “All types of assisted
housing programs, except FHA housing, have negative impacts on property
values in nearby areas, and their coefficients are statistically significant.”161
Numerous studies, funded by both private and federal grants, have oc-
curred since 1986 demonstrating that statistically significant negative
impacts affect nearby real property values due to the insertion and oper-
ation of AHF-type housing facilities in a residential neighborhood.162 It is
inequitable for an integrated corporate enterprise to generate hundreds
of thousands of dollars in revenue per year by turning a single-family resi-
dence into a 24-hour operating business, when that business’s economic
spillover effects represent statistically significant negative externalities.
As a result, § 3605 serves no benefit to an applicant that threatens a munic-
ipality in an AHF-based zoning modification request or CUP application.
D. 42 U.S.C. § 3606, the Transferability of Real Property
Ownership, and the FHAA’s Constitutional Basis
42 U.S.C. § 3606 states:
After December 31, 1968, it shall be unlawful to deny any
person access to or membership or participation in any
multiple-listing service, real estate brokers’ organization
or other service, organization, or facility relating to the
business of selling or renting dwellings, or to discriminate
against him in the terms or conditions of such access, mem-
bership, or participation, on account of race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.163
159 Grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy
Development and Research; see also Chang-Moo Lee et al., The Differential Impacts of
Federally Assisted Housing Programs on Nearby Property Values: A Philadelphia Case
Study, 10 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 75, 92 (1999) (detailing the background of each author).
160 Lee et al., supra note 159, at 80.
161 Id. at 86.
162 Id. at 92–93 (referencing multiple studies of this nature).
163 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (2006); see also Pandozy v. Segan, 518 F. Supp. 2d 550, 557 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (holding that the plaintiff’s claim failed because he did not allege that the defendants
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In the instant case study, this provision appears inapplicable because the
real property and improvements already have been sold to an arm of the
Integrated Enterprise.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 and Issues of Standing
Relative to another arguably relevant provision, Section 3617 states:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or inter-
fere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on
account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account
of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the
exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by
section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.164
Although this provision ostensibly applies to states and political subdivi-
sions such as municipalities based on United States v. City of Parma,165
several material facts and controlling federal cases distinguish Parma
from the situation that this Article analyzes.
In this situation, under the FHAA, a strong argument exists that an
applicant would lack standing.166 Even if an ACF-based CUP applicant
constitutes an “aggrieved person” under the FHAA, such an aggrieved per-
son must satisfy the standing requirements mandated by Article III of the
U.S. Constitution, which limits federal court jurisdiction to real cases or
controversies.167 This language means that any plaintiff who “failed to make
out a case or controversy between himself and the defendant” must be de-
nied standing.168 In Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, the Court articulated
three minimum, irreducible requirements that serve as conditions prece-
dent for Article III standing.169
“engaged in ‘residential real estate-related transactions,’ or that they provided a real estate
listing or brokerage service, or that he was denied participation in such a service”).
164 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006).
165 661 F.2d 562, 571–72 (6th Cir. 1981).
166 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 492 (1975). The United States Supreme Court recently
underscored this doctrine was narrowing further during its latest term that ended in late
June 2013. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013) (holding that no
standing existed by the appellants in part due to claiming a mere generalized grievance
by someone lacking a concrete interest in the case or controversy and that “[t]o have
standing, a litigant must seek relief for an injury that affects him in a ‘personal and
individual way’ ”) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
167 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
168 Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979).
169 Id. at 120–21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (“Over the
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First, the injury-in-fact requirement: The plaintiff must have
suffered an injury that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or im-
minent,” not “conjectural or hypothetical.”170 Applied to the facts of the
case study, because no concrete injury exists and only a conjectural or hypo-
thetical injury exists (at best), the Enterprise, as a potential plaintiff, does
not seem to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing to bring
a lawsuit.
Second, the causation requirement: Even if a potential plaintiff’s
injury may be “indirect,” the injury must be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the in-
dependent action of some third party not before the court.”171 Applied, as
discussed in detail in the denial of Integrated Enterprise’s application,172
Montgomery would not have engaged in any action; simply, Montgomery
would be enforcing its existing zoning laws in a consistent manner.
Third, the redressability requirement: The Court stated “it must
be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘re-
dressed by a favorable decision.’ ”173 Given the totality of the law addressed
in this Article, applied to the facts of the case study, no reasonable person
could claim that it must be likely, rather than speculative, that any injury
would be redressed by a favorable decision.
Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County174 illustrates this point
well. In Hallmark, property developers sued under the FHAA, claiming
that the municipality’s denial of their rezoning application simply imple-
mented the community’s discriminatory attitude against a protected class
of persons that the developers sought to house.175 The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals indicated that, despite expert testimony to the contrary,
the municipality did not discriminate on a prohibited basis because even
the expert’s testimony regarding disparate impact was “inherently spec-
ulative,” particularly given that other housing existed in the municipal
area for people in the group protected from discrimination.176 That same
logic holds true in the Montgomery case study and, as a result, threats
years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing
contains three elements.”).
170 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted).
171 Id. at 560–61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)).
172 See infra Part II.B.
173 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
174 Hallmark Devs., Inc., 466 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2006).
175 Id. at 1276.
176 Id. at 1286–87.
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of the municipality’s having violated the FHAA appear to be mere saber-
rattling by the Applicant, the Integrated Corporate Enterprise, or both,
with little to no basis in law or fact.
In 2010, the Sixth Circuit distinguished Parma in White Oak
Property Development, LLC v. Washington Township when it affirmed the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio—the relevant federal
district court for Montgomery. In White Oak, the Sixth Circuit said:
[T]he evidence of record in City of Parma—absent in the
present case—demonstrated a pervasive pattern and prac-
tice of racial discrimination in housing decisions by Parma
officials, including: Parma’s “small fraction of one per cent”
Black population compared to the 16% Black population in
the Cleveland metropolitan area, Parma’s reputation for
hostility toward Blacks, “statements of elected officials of
Parma which were either overtly racist or were found to
have racist meanings[,]” and a history of challenged housing
decisions, all of which were “based on a desire to keep minor-
ities out of the community and . . . had an acute and fore-
seeable segregative effect on this virtually all-white city.”177
The White Oak decision represents controlling federal law in the case
study’s jurisdiction. In White Oak, a company challenged Washington
Township’s residential-zoning resolutions, a challenge that Washington
Township’s Trustees ultimately denied based on existing provisions in
Washington Township’s zoning resolutions.178 The company sued claim-
ing that the zoning resolution was unconstitutional on its face, that Wash-
ington Township violated 42 U.S.C. § 1301, and six additional causes of
action.179 The court rejected all of the claims contained in the company’s
lawsuit.180 Applying the White Oak test to the facts presented in the case
study leads to the conclusion that no legitimate claim or controversy could
arise in favor of the Applicant. Specifically, no evidence exists that the
municipality has: (i) a disproportionate fraction of disabled persons rel-
ative to the general population, (ii) elected officials who have made no
177 White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC, 606 F.3d 842, 851 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Parma, 661
F.2d 562, 566–67 (6th Cir. 1981) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
178 Id. at 844–46.
179 Id. at 846–47.
180 Id. at 842.
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statements antagonistic toward disabled persons, and (iii) any history
of challenged housing decisions based on any desire to keep disabled per-
sons out of the community.181
Also favoring the Application’s rejection as a protected act is that
as recently as 2012 the Sixth Circuit strongly reiterated its narrow grounds
relative to companies’ attempts to leverage antidiscrimination laws in
their favor. In HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor,182 the federal appeals
court chided the plaintiff company’s weak allegations of municipal dis-
crimination against handicapped persons under the FHAA by reminding
the plaintiff company of the strong burden that a plaintiff company must
meet in the Sixth Circuit:
In this Circuit, a plaintiff is required to demonstrate “dis-
criminatory animus” to prevail on an interference claim
under the Act . . . . The developers’ vague and conclusory
allegations that Ann Arbor acted with “a discriminatory
intent, purpose, and motivation” to prevent handicapped
people from living on the property do not transform the de-
velopers’ otherwise insufficient factual pleadings into alle-
gations that plausibly support an inference of discriminatory
animus. Indeed, such allegations are “[c]onclusory allega-
tions or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allega-
tions [for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 3617 interference
claim against the local municipality],” . . . and we conclude
that the district court did not err in finding the developers’
complaint insufficient.183
In the case study, no discriminatory animus exists by a municipality
following its own zoning ordinance and denying the Application. More-
over, the HDC court dovetailed FHAA §§ 3617, 3604, and 3605 through its
analysis by asserting “To show disparate impact [under 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604,
3605], a plaintiff must demonstrate that a facially neutral policy or prac-
tice has the effect of discriminating against a protected class of which the
181 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
182 White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC, 675 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2012).
183 Id. at 613–14 (quoting Tam Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 583 F.3d 896, 903 (6th
Cir. 2009)) (emphasis added); see also Michigan Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18
F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that § 3617 covers actors “who are in a position di-
rectly to disrupt the exercise or enjoyment of a protected right and exercise their powers
with a discriminatory animus”).
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plaintiff is a member.”184 In the Montgomery case study, therefore, the
municipality’s enforcement of its facially neutral policy and its practices
lack an effect of discriminating against a protected class.185
Even without any animus analysis, the Applicant still appears to
lack an ability to pass the relevant federal appeals court’s test for discrim-
inatory impact without discriminatory intent as articulated in Arthur v.
Toledo.186 The Arthur court articulated a three-prong inquiry as to whether
a discriminatory effect would still exist under the FHAA, even assuming no
discriminatory intent, which involves determining: (1) the relative strength
of the applicant’s showing of discriminatory effect; (2) the municipality’s
interest in taking the action complained of; and (3) if the applicant sought
to compel the municipality to affirmatively provide housing for members
of minority groups, or merely to restrain the municipality from interfering
with individual property owners who wish to provide such housing.187 Ap-
plying that three-prong test to the case study, (1) the Applicant cannot
show any discriminatory effect, as none has occurred; (2) a rejection of the
Application would maintain the standards in the municipality’s existing
zoning ordinance standards and fulfill a core function of government,
namely protecting its residents, including schoolchildren, from direct health
and safety threats; and (3) the Applicant wants the municipality to affir-
matively change its existing zoning and use restrictions, rather than en-
force and maintain the status quo.188
E. Synthesis
Thus, under federal law, rules, regulations, statutory history, and
federal court opinions—supported by scientific fact and empirical financial
data—no legitimacy exists for applicants seeking zoning variances or
184 HDC, LLC, 675 F.3d at 613 (quoting Graoch Assocs. # 33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson
Cnty. Metro Human Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 371 (6th Cir. 2007)). In addition,
other federal appellate courts have taken similar positions. In Artisan/American Corp.
v. City of Alvin, a municipality’s rejection of a developer’s specific project based on the
general knowledge of the project was not arbitrary nor unreasonable under the FHAA.
588 F.3d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 2009). In that case, the court held that no evidence existed that
the municipality’s resolutions constituted departures from the municipality’s normal pol-
icies and procedures. Id.
185 See also infra Part V.B (describing material doubts on whether the plaintiff applicant
in the case study could be a member of such a class).
186 Arthur v. Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986).
187 Id.
188 Id.
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AHF-based CUPs to force municipalities such as Montgomery to grant a
zoning variance or an AHF-based CUP. Relying on public policy rationale,
a strong counter-reason exists, however, for municipalities to not grant such
an application. Articulated by Chief Justice Roberts, government actors
making admissions-based decisions should not place their imprimaturs on
decisions that discriminate in favor of one group’s admission to an AHF
over another group’s admission to that same AHF.189
1. Alleged Age Discrimination for Persons Over Fifty-Five or
Sixty-Two Years of Age
An ACF-based CUP applicant also may attempt to avail itself of the
protections of 42 U.S.C. § 3607.190 As applied to the Montgomery case study,
however, nearly every home within 300 feet of the subject parcel contains
residents who are over both fifty-five and sixty-two years of age.191 A num-
ber of members of the Montgomery City Council are over either age fifty-
five or sixty-two as well.192 As a result, any claim of age discrimination
simply does not pass muster.
2. Familial Status May Be Dependent on State Law
The FHAA defines “familial status” as one or more individuals
under eighteen years old being domiciled with “(1) a parent or another per-
son having legal custody of such individual or individuals; or (2) the des-
ignee of such parent or other person having such custody, with the written
permission of such parent or other person.”193
Regardless of whether one has personally evolved on the issue194—
as have both of Ohio’s U.S. Senators, Republican Rob Portman and Demo-
crat Sherrod Brown, as well as Democratic President Barack Obama, and
Republican former Vice President Dick Cheney—it remains true that
Article XV, § 11 of the Ohio Constitution unambiguously reads: “This state
and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for
relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the
189 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
190 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (2006).
191 See id. § 3607(b)(1)–(2).
192 See also City Council, CITY OF MONTGOMERY, http://www.montgomeryohio.org/govern
ment/city-council/, archived at http://perma.cc/P34P-WDUE (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
193 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k) (2006).
194 See the Commonwealth of Mass. Dep’t. of Pub. Health Reg. of Vital Rec. & Stats. Cert.
of Marriage No. 972526 (July 11, 2011) (on file with author).
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design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.”195 Of course, the case
study does not deal with marriage per se. But, the case study does concern
the public policy ramifications of how Ohio’s Constitution views traditional
single families, which is relevant to any discussion of single-family resi-
dentially zoned housing.
In 2004, Ohio voters amended the state constitution, making it
abundantly clear that as a matter of public policy, the state does not want
to redefine what constitutes a “traditional family.”196 Suppose that X is a
member of the Ohio Bar, as well as New York, a jurisdiction that recog-
nized non-traditional variations of single families after X became a member
of the bar. To become a member of the bar in each jurisdiction, a lawyer
must submit to and maintain an oath to uphold that state’s constitution,
laws, and regulations. Thus, X in New York must accept that the state’s
definition of a traditional single family changed materially during the time
since X became a member of the New York bar. In contrast, having made
a similar oath to become a member of the Ohio bar, X must interpret its
constitution and the laws, rules, regulations, and policies that it permits
or restricts as they exist—not how X or any other officer of the court may
prefer them to be.
Applying the exceedingly strong public policy rationale underpinning
Ohio’s constitution to any municipality’s zoning laws should make one rec-
ognize that approving an AHF-based zoning variance or CUP application
in an area zoned for single family residential use—not multi-family or com-
mercial use—would violate the public policy underpinning not only the en-
tirety of state law, but also the state constitution on which that law rests.
To some officers of the court, oaths and commitments made to a state bar
trump personal or financial preferences (or both), as well as an individual’s
personal distaste for certain laws or constitutional provisions. But within
the past decade, voters in the Ohio made one thing abundantly clear to
every sworn judge, lawyer, elected official, and administrative agent in the
state: You cannot change the meaning or definition of a traditional single
family in our state.197
IV. STATE ZONING ORDINANCES, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS, AND
OTHER PUBLIC POLICIES
Moving from the potential applicability of a state constitution’s
definition of a family relative to a federal law, this Part provides a broad
195 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.
196 See id.
197 Cf. discussion supra Part II.A.
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overview of the subject state’s zoning laws and court opinions, how they
impact its municipalities, and why they raise concerns with how munici-
palities may proceed in this matter. This Part then briefly discusses state
antidiscrimination laws and other public policies.198 State law permits
zoning boards or other municipalities to grant or deny CUPs in the case
study’s municipality.199 Since granting CUPs may impact nearby proper-
ties significantly, Ohio’s policy dictates the requirement of an administra-
tive hearing on a CUP application.200 This administrative permission by
a municipal tribunal201 permits property owners to engage their property
in “a use which the regulations expressly permit under conditions speci-
fied in the zoning regulations.”202 Converse to the broad property rights
recognized by engagement conforming to permitted-use zoning, CUPs orig-
inate from the Standard State Zoning Act (“SSZA”).203 As the Ohio Supreme
Court indicated:
The inclusion of conditional use provisions in zoning legis-
lation is based upon a legislative recognition that although
certain uses are not necessarily inconsistent with the zon-
ing objectives of a district, their nature is such that their
compatibility in any particular area depends upon sur-
rounding circumstances. Thus, the legislative body provides
for their inclusion in a district only upon administrative
198 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (LexisNexis 2007) (prohibiting discrimination in
residential real estate-related transactions); 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a) (2006).
199 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 713.06 (LexisNexis 2008) (permitting municipal planning
commissions to divide the municipality into zones or districts “in the interest of the public
health, safety, convenience, comfort, prosperity, or general welfare”); § 713.07 (granting
municipalities authorization to certify and regulate zoning and districting according to
uses “in the interest of the promotion of the public health, safety, convenience, comfort,
prosperity, or general welfare”); § 713.09 (describing setbacks, areas, lines, and building bulk
and locations); § 713.10 (authorizing districting or zoning of municipalities on any combi-
nation of two or more purposes in § 713.07–713.09); § 713.12 (describing notice and hearing
procedures for municipal zoning regulations); § 713.121 (indicating the statute of limi-
tations for a procedural error by the administrative entity); § 713.13 (permitting owners
of contiguous or neighboring property to sue for injunctive relief). See also OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 303.14(C) (LexisNexis 2009) (dealing with counties’ boards of zoning appeals);
§ 519.14(C) (concerning townships’ boards of zoning appeals).
200 Kipp v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Stonelick Twp., No. CA2003-10-086, 2004 WL 2504499,
at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2004).
201 See OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
202 STUART MECK & KENNETH PEARLMAN, OHIO PLANNING AND ZONING LAW § 9:11 (2013).
203 See ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING
ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS 9 (rev.
ed. 1926), available at http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/StndZoningEnablingAct1926.pdf.
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approval granted in accordance with legislatively prescribed
standards and conditions.204
Emphasizing the administrative nature of this process, the court stated
that a municipality’s decision to deny a CUP application was “not a nar-
rowing of a zoning classification,” which would be an improper legislative
exercise of government power,205 and that the administrative decision was
entitled to a presumption of validity.206
Beyond requiring such a presumption, the Ohio Court of Appeals
has held that “the party challenging the board’s determination has the bur-
den of showing its invalidity.”207 In appealing such a decision, a trial or ap-
pellate court would “accordingly be obliged to affirm the action taken by the
board, absent evidence that the board’s decision was unconstitutional, ille-
gal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponder-
ance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence.”208 Therefore, under
Ohio law, reviewing courts must presume the validity of a decision to deny
a zoning variance application.209
Some courts have held that where a zoning resolution fails to impose
a time limit on the business’s operations, a municipal CUP approval cannot
place a time limit on the business’s operations.210 Upon this recognition,
discomfort likely would arise for municipalities and neighboring single
family real property owners. A municipality’s CUP approval authorizing
operations of a 24-hour business places non-ACF residents in a regular
204 Gerzeny v. Richfield Twp., 405 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 (Ohio 1980) (footnotes omitted). Under
Ohio law’s interpretation of a “CUP,” the term “use” is an activity. Kipp, 2004 WL 2504499,
at *1 (quoting both Young v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, No. 17877, 2000 WL 125972, at *1
(Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2000), and STUART MECK & KENNETH PEARLMAN, OHIO PLANNING
AND ZONING LAW § 9:11 (2004)).
205 Cmty. Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 613 N.E.2d 580,
583 (Ohio 1993).
206 Id. at 584 (citing C. Miller Chevrolet, Inc. v. Willoughby Hills, 313 N.E.2d 400, 403–04
(Ohio 1974)); see also BP Oil Co. v. Dayton Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 672 N.E.2d 256, 259
(Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
207 Burnett v. LaGrange Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, No. 07CA009119, 2007 WL 4374427,
at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2007) (citing Consol. Mgmt., Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 452
N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ohio 1983)).
208 Id. (quoting Consol. Mgmt., Inc., 452 N.E.2d at 1290).
209 Chafe Towing, LLC v. Springfield Twp., No. 20632, 2001 WL 1626942, at *2 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 19, 2001) (citing C. Miller Chevrolet, Inc., 313 N.E.2d at 401).
210 See, e.g., Millcreek Bd. of Twp. Trs. v. Davisson, No. 14-06-50, 2007 WL 2983080, at *6–7
(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2007) (holding that the Board of Zoning Appeals had no authority
to impose a time limitation on the CUP).
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state of disturbance with customers, employees, independent contractors,
and government officials of all sorts coming and going day and night. Such
activity would violate the policy of promoting the “public health, safety, con-
venience, comfort, prosperity, or general welfare,”211 with the municipality
powerless to retroactively change the zoning to account for these issues.212
The exacerbation of this discomfort would not be unexpected. Courts
have held that once a municipality has granted a CUP not only does that
conditional use remain after transfer of ownership,213 but the CUP also
becomes “the functional equivalent of a permitted use.”214 The combination
of an ACF-CUP approval of a 24-hour business that permits various stake-
holders to come and go at all hours of the day or night with the practical
elimination of business-purpose provisions within company charters—
permitting businesses to shift business lines without suffering legal con-
sequences for acting ultra vires—is of grave concern for a natural person’s
economic and real property rights, particularly for owners on a small cul-de-
sac in a neighborhood well within the zoning for single-family residences.
Federal concerns echo Ohio’s statutory concerns regarding parking
on the cul-de-sac and nearby streets. Specifically, the U.S. Department of
Justice stated: “[N]eighbors and local government officials may be legit-
imately concerned that a group home for adults in certain circumstances
may create more demand for on-street parking than would a typical
family.”215 Also discomforting is the uncertainty as to whether a specific
“operator” would apply for and receive the appropriate permits from Ohio’s
relevant administrative agency, such as the Ohio Department of Mental
Health and Addiction Services (“DMHAS”), given the questionable Inte-
grated Enterprise discussed earlier.216 To illustrate, as of October 1, 2013,
My Family Home Operating Co., LLC has never before received approval
from the DMHAS to operate an AFH under the then-existing statute217
211 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 713.06 (LexisNexis 2008).
212 Davisson, 2007 WL 2983080, at *7.
213 See, e.g., Baughman v. Millcreek Bd. of Zoning Appeals, No. 8-01-27, 2002 WL 1773043,
at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2002).
214 Welling v. Perry Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, No. 2003CA00303, 2004 WL 540290, at
*2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2004).
215 See Joint Statement of the Department of Justice and the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/final8
_1.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Joint Statement].
216 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5119.22(D)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); see also OHIO ADMIN.
CODE 5122-33-03(B) (Supp. 2012).
217 ACF List by County as of Oct. 3, 2013, OHIO DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH & ADDICTION SERVS.,
http://mha.ohio.gov/Portals/0/assets/Regulation/LicensureAndCertification/acf-listing
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and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder in Ohio’s admin-
istrative code.218
The following three entities are listed as licensed by the DMHAS.219
In addition to the Integrated Enterprise, two other entities also exist: Our
Family Home, Inc. (an Ohio for-profit corporation)220 and Our Family Home
(an apparent non-corporation).221 Although all three entities have differ-
ent addresses, the similar names and telephone numbers listed for each
entity are consistent. This would lead a reasonable person to question the
integrated nature of the entities. To confuse matters more, another entity
which is unlisted by DMHAS and, according to the relevant filing with the
secretary of state, did not receive consent to use a protected name, is “Our
Family Home, LLC.”222 Further, OFH Properties, LLC owns the subject
property in the case study.223
V. THE MUNICIPALITY’S ZONING CODES AND ORDINANCES
This Part of the Article provides a brief overview of local municipal
ordinances at the heart of the case study. First, this Part reviews the
municipality’s general zoning. Next, this Part analyzes conditional use.
Third, this Part reviews the meaning of “family homes” for “handicapped”
persons. Finally, this Part synthesizes these items.
A. The Municipality’s General Zoning
The municipality’s zoning code indicates that a zoning map es-
tablishes the municipality’s zoning districts.224 Per the zoning map, the
-by-county.pdf(last visited Mar. 15, 2015) [hereinafter ACF List by County]; see generally
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5119.22 (Supp. 2012).
218 OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5122-33-03 (Supp. 2012–2013).
219 See ACF List by County, supra note 217.
220 Articles of Incorporation for Our Family Home, Inc., STATE OF OHIO CERTIFICATE (Doc.
No. 200608202924), available at http://www2.sos.state.oh.us/reports/rwservlet?imgc&Din
=200608202924, archived at http://perma.cc/MF53-QN4Q.
221 See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 1 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
222 Articles of Organization for a Domestic Profit Limited Liability Company for Our Family
Home Health Care, LLC, OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE OF OHIO, available at http://www2
.sos.state.oh.us/reports/rwservlet?imgc&Din=201003200606, archived at http://perma.cc
/8Q5W-NM35.
223 See RHODES, supra note 16.
224 MONTGOMERY, OHIO, MUN. ZONING CODE § 151.0101 (2011), http://www.egovlink.com
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case study subject’s real-property parcel is zoned well within “Zone A.”225
A parcel in Zone A must be a “Single Family Residential Residence” within
a residential zone.226 The municipality also provides for several types of
other zoning, including multi-family residential227 and business districts.228
The purposes of these districts include:
(a) To regulate the bulk and location of dwellings . . .
(b) To provide for the proper location of institutions and
other community facilities so as to increase the general con-
venience, safety, and amenities within the community;
(c) To protect the desirable characteristics and promote
the stability of existing residential development;
(d) To regulate the density and distribution of popula-
tion . . . to avoid congestion and provide adequate public
services.229
Although the municipality provides adequate public services,230 the mu-
nicipality regulations state that a use listed in § 151.1003 “shall be per-
mitted as a conditional use in a district when denoted by the letter ‘C’,
provided the Planning Commission and/or Council make the determination
that the requirements of 151.20 have been met, according to the procedures
set forth in Chapter 150.16.”231 Thus, in the Montgomery case study, while
a family home for disabled persons is listed as a permitted conditional use
in all zoning districts of Montgomery, the physical and mental conditions
listed in the Application failed to use the inclusive language of disability;
instead, it stated two specific categories, neither of which involves a cur-
rently recognized mental disorder diagnosis for living persons.232
/public_documents300/montgomery/published_documents/Ordinances/CHAPTER%20151
%20-%202013.pdf.
225 Zoning Map/Address Map of City of Montgomery, Ohio, CITY OF MONTGOMERY, available
at http://www.egovlink.com/public_documents300/montgomery/published_documents/Busi
ness/ZONING_MAP.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
226 MUN. ZONING CODE § 151.0101.
227 See Zoning Map/Address Map, supra note 225 (labeled under “Residential Districts”
as D-2 and D-3).
228 Id. (labeling “Business Districts” as (1) Office, (2) Limited Business, (3) General Business,
(4) Core Old Montgomery, (5) Outer Old Montgomery, and (6) Old Montgomery Gateway).
229 MUN. ZONING CODE § 151.1001 (emphasis added).
230 MUN. ZONING CODE § 151.1002.
231 MUN. ZONING CODE § 151.1002(b) (emphasis added).
232 See discussion supra Part II (discussing how the Application was “to operate an Adult
2015] PRETEXTUALLY PROFITEERING SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS 705
B. Analysis of Conditional Use
The municipality’s conditional use section includes a purpose
statement relative to “safeguarding . . . the health, safety, and general wel-
fare of the community.”233 The Purpose section also describes a “more de-
tailed evaluation of each use . . . with respect to such considerations as
location, design, size, method(s) of operation, intensity of use . . . and traffic
generation.”234 In making its analysis, the Planning Commission shall:
[R]eview the particular facts and circumstances of each
proposed use in terms of the following criteria and shall find
adequate evidence that the use as proposed:
(a) Will be designed, constructed, operated and main-
tained so as to be harmonious and appropriate in appear-
ance with the existing or intended character of the general
vicinity, and that such use will not essentially change the
character of the same area;
(b) Will not be detrimental to property values in the
immediate vicinity;235
(c) Will not restrict or adversely affect the existing use
of the adjacent property owners . . . ;
. . . 
(f) The establishment, maintenance or operation of the
conditional use will not be detrimental to or endanger the
public health, safety or general welfare;
(g) The hours of operation of the proposed use are simi-
lar to a use permitted in the district . . . ;
. . .
(k) The establishment of the conditional use should not
be detrimental to the economic welfare of the community
by creating excessive additional requirements at public cost
for public facilities such as police, fire and schools; and
(l) There is minimal potential for future hardship on
the conditional use that could result from the proposed
Family Home for up to five Alzheimer’s and/or dementia patients at an existing single
family house”).
233 MUN. ZONING CODE § 151.2001.
234 Id. (emphasis added).
235 MUN. ZONING CODE § 151.2002. See generally MUN. ZONING CODE §§ 151.2001–151.2008
(listing all “Conditional Use Regulations” under Chapter 151.20).
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use being surrounded by uses permitted by right that may
be incompatible.236
Analyzing each of the above sections relevant to the case study’s
municipality in turn reveals the following information. First, the changes,
to comply with accommodations, likely would not be harmonious and appro-
priate in appearance with the existing or intended character of the general
vicinity, and such use would, in essence, change the character of the same
area. Specifically, the municipality has an existing articulation of the lot re-
quirements for standard single-family-detached and two-family dwellings.237
The minimum lot frontage requirement for standard single-family “A”
zoned detached dwellings is fifty feet, the side yard requirement is fifteen
feet, and the rear yard is thirty-five feet.238 Here, one must question how
the rear yard changes would comport with these provisions because the
minimum setback requirements must not change for frontage of fifty feet,
regardless of a CUP of this sort.239 As a result, the applicant’s ability to com-
ply with this zoning provision appears highly improbable.
Additionally, “[i]n any residential district, the percentage of a lot
covered by a nonresidential use, including buildings and parking, shall not
exceed 40% of the total area of the lot.”240 Simply applying rough estimates
support rejecting the application. The house itself occupies 13.24% of the
lot.241 Adding that tenants and paid caregivers would also use the lot for
outdoor time raises this percentage to nearly 100%. Further, caregivers,
service providers, friends, and family will likely use the driveway for park-
ing and may even require the need for additional parking on the lot—
likely beyond the required structural additions. A reasonable expectation
exists that 40–100% of the lot’s total area would be for a commercial pur-
pose, a non-residential use, violating municipal zoning provisions.
Second, the likely changes would be detrimental to property values
in the immediate vicinity.242 As indicated, numerous studies demonstrate
236 MUN. ZONING CODE § 151.2002.
237 See MUN. ZONING CODE § 151.1004 (“Lots created for single-family . . . and two-family
dwellings where permitted shall comply with the area and dimension requirements specified
in Schedule 151.1004 for the district in which the lot is located.”).
238 MUN. ZONING CODE § 151.1005 (using a schedule to establish, in feet, the yard require-
ments for standard single-family detached dwellings and two-family dwellings).
239 See MUN. ZONING CODE §§ 151.2004, 151.2007(j).
240 MUN. ZONING CODE § 151.2005 (2013).
241 See RHODES, supra note 16. The house covers 2653 square feet on the .460 acre lot.
Given that 43,560 square feet are in an acre and .460 of an acre is approximately 20,037
square feet, the building alone constitutes 13.24% ((2653÷20037)×100%) of the lot.
242 See supra Part IV; MUN. ZONING CODE § 151.2002(b).
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statistical significance relative to damaging negative externalities and spill-
over effects impacting the intrinsic value of the neighboring real estate and
improvements should the applicant, the Integrated Corporate Enterprise,
or both engage in the business activities contemplated by the application.243
Third, the likely structural changes would restrict or adversely
affect the existing use of the adjacent property by its owners, particularly
as to parking on a five lot cul-de-sac or to children playing in yards that
may encounter wandering tenants of the subject property. And again, the
Department of Justice has stated that “neighbors and local government offi-
cials may be legitimately concerned that a group home for adults in certain
circumstances may create more demand for on-street parking than would
a typical family.”244
Fourth, the establishment, maintenance, or operation of the condi-
tional use would be detrimental to or endanger the public health, safety
or general welfare.245
Fifth, the hours of operation of the proposed use are in no way
similar to a use permitted in the district. The Our Family Home website
indicates that commercial activity occurs 24-hours a day at its facilities,
and a myriad of legal problems exists once an Ohio municipality approves
a CUP for a 24-hour business.
Sixth, any argument that the establishment of the conditional use
would not be detrimental to the municipality’s economic welfare by creat-
ing excessive additional requirements at public cost for public facilities
such as police, fire and schools is disingenuous; an applicant bears the bur-
den of demonstrating that it would not be, based on its other affiliated com-
mercial properties for AHF or ACF use.246
Finally, far more than minimal potential exists for future hard-
ship.247 For example, courts have held that where a zoning resolution fails
to impose a time limit on a business’s operations, the CUP may not limit
the business’s operations; this failure allows customers, employees, indepen-
dent contractors, and government officials to come and go day or night,248
thereby violating the state policy of promoting the “public health and
243 See supra Part IV.
244 See Joint Statement, supra note 215.
245 See supra discussion Part V.B.
246 MUN. ZONING CODE § 151.2007(j).
247 MUN. ZONING CODE § 151.1002.
248 See, e.g., Bd. of Twp. Trs. v. Davisson, No. 14-06-50, 2007 WL 2983080, at *7 (Ohio Ct.
App. Oct. 15, 2007) (holding that the Board of Zoning Appeals had no authority to impose
a time limitation on the CUP).
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safety, . . . convenience, comfort, prosperity, or general welfare,”249 and
the CUP is powerless to change the zoning to account for this matter
retroactively.250 To amplify the real prospect of this future hardship from
the proposed use, once a municipality has granted a CUP not only does the
CUP become “the functional equivalent of a permitted use”251 but that con-
ditional use also remains after a transfer of ownership.252
C. Analysis of Family Homes for “Handicapped Persons”
Section 151.2007(g) articulates the provisions regarding family
homes for handicapped persons:
(1) The persons residing in such residential home shall
live as a single housekeeping unit in a single dwelling unit
and maintain said home as their sole, bona fide, permanent
residence. The term “permanent residence” means:
(A) The resident intends to live at the dwelling on a
continuing basis; and,
(B) The resident does not live at the dwelling in order to
receive counseling, treatment, therapy or medical care.253
While (B) above contravenes the Our Family Home website, (A)
above seems offensive but practically impossible since neither people with
a prior diagnosis of dementia nor decedents receiving the post-mortem
Alzheimer’s diagnosis could “intend” anything on a continuing basis under
§ 151.2007(g)(1)(A), per the DSM-5 or other science. Also, this situation
appears to violate (B) because the “but-for-cause” of the person living at
the ACF is to receive treatment or care.
Nothing mandates that a municipality, such as Montgomery,
approve a CUP in light of the purposes set forth in the MZC. Given that
a cemetery also receives similar treatment under the municipality’s zoning
ordinance, one must ask: why would neighbors not apply for a cemetery
CUP for their real property, given that approximately eighty-eight percent
249 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 303.02 (LexisNexis 2009).
250 Davisson, 2007 WL 2983080, at *7 (holding that the reasons provided were not sufficient
to justify the imposition of a time limit).
251 Welling v. Perry Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, No. 2003CA00303, 2004 WL 540290, at
*2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2004).
252 See Baughman v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals. No. 8-01-27, 2002 WL 1773043, at *3 (Ohio
Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2002).
253 See MUN. ZONING CODE § 151.2007(g) (2013).
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of Our Family Home’s residents die in Our Family Homes’s homes?254
Approving a CUP for a cemetery would not only be profitable for neigh-
boring real property owners, thereby expanding the municipality’s economic
production possibilities, but also would be efficient in terms of opportunity
costs by burying those former tenants quickly, adjacent to where the resi-
dents pass away. This admittedly absurd hypothetical could sadly represent
a very real conclusion should a tribunal approve a CUP application in a
municipality with such zoning ordinances, setting into effect other actions
by affected parties, such as lawsuits involving private servitude.
1. Synthesis, Other Inconsistencies, and Concerns
With regard to each of the foregoing issues, the relevant federal
circuit court placed the burden on the CUP applicant, not the municipal-
ity. Applied to the case study, it would appear that the applicant has an
extremely high burden to overcome.
In an e-mail dated June 17, 2013, from Damante to Mr. Davis of
Montgomery, Damante advanced several troubling or inconsistent state-
ments.255 Regardless of the type of ACF, Ohio has not required proof of any
liability insurance coverage since October 16, 2009.256 As of October 3,
2013, the MSHAS licensure certification listing lists Our Family Home
in New Albany, Ohio and Our Family Home and Our Family Home, Inc.
in Worthington, Ohio as licensed AFH-type ACFs.257 While each of these
entities list different addresses, each use the same telephone number,
presumably serving as an integrated entity for legal purposes.258 Yet in
his e-mail to Davis, Damante stated that “our caregivers do not give med-
ical care.”259
While the Our Family Home’s FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions)
webpage is careful not to use the de jure lexicon of “medical care,” in
254 Source on file with author.
255 See E-mail, supra note 14.
256 Adult Care Facility Initial Application, OHIO DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH, http://mha.ohio
.gov/Portals/0/assets/Regulation/LicensureAndCertification/acf-application-initial.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
257 See ACF List by County, supra note 217.
258 See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS § 28.02[A]
(2d ed. Supp. 2011–2012) (discussing the “General Enterprise Doctrine”).
259 See E-mail, supra note 14; see also supra Part I.A (discussing potentially using revenue-
generating residents to act as pretextual tenants serving as revenue drivers for the greater
integrated enterprise during a holding period that would permit the Enterprise’s property
management and property services divisions to drive additional revenue for the Enterprise
based on the Application’s approval).
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response to question four, addressing dementia/Alzheimer’s training, the
page states: “Our caregivers are trained by our Nurse Manager on a regular
basis.”260 Assuming the training goes beyond informing the applicant’s
caregivers that dementia no longer is a mental disorder and that Alzhei-
mer’s can only be diagnosed post-mortem, why would a nurse be needed
to provide training on matters that do not constitute medical care?
Additionally, Enterprise’s response to question seven, which asks
if a nurse is available at all times, states: “We have a licensed nurse on
call 24/7 [who] comes to all the homes numerous times throughout the
week to assess residents.”261 Assessing tenants based on the sole criteria
of what used to be a mental disorder by providing some sort of medical care,
at least in the common parlance; her coming-and-going “24/7" adds to the
previously stated concerns of the permanent long-term effects of a munici-
pality’s approval of a CUP application for a 24-hour business in a single-
family home, residentially zoned cul-de-sac.
Indeed, by virtue of an ACF/AHF license, Ohio’s administrative
code specifically states that ACFs provide certain care.262 Yet, municipal-
ities should gravely consider during its deliberative process on an ACF-
based CUP application that caregivers at Ohio AHFs are not required to
have any continuing education or training beyond CPR, leading a reason-
able person to assume approval of an application will increase the resource
usage of a municipality’s fire department or EMTs.263
Furthermore, the CEO has claimed that California features more
than 5,000 such similar residences.264 In making that assertion, the CEO
failed to discuss how many of these residences actually were located in
zoned areas, required zone variances, or needed CUP application approvals.
Far more importantly, however, the CEO, the applicant, Our Family Home,
260 Frequently Asked Questions, OUR FAMILY HOME, http://www.ourfamilyhomeinc.com
/faq.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4QFE-2ZF6 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
261 Id.
262 See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5122-33-01(E)(1) (Supp. 2012–2013).
263 See Eric M. Carlson, Critical Issues in Assisted Living: Who’s In, Who’s Out, and Who’s
Providing the Care 72–73 (2005), available at http://www.nsclc.org/wp-content/uploads
/2011/07/Critical-Issues-in-Assisted-Living.pdf (providing a chart of names used by states);
see also id. at 66 (showing Ohio lacking in training but requiring a CPR Certification,
which may constitute medical care provision); id. at 69 (evidencing no Ohio requirement for
continuing education for caregivers at adult care facilities, placing Ohio in the minority
of states on that matter).
264 Group Home for Alzheimer’s Patients Opens in Worthington, 10TV.COM (Aug. 21, 2012,
5:47 PM), available at http://www.10tv.com/content/stories/2012/08/21/worthington-group
-home-for-alheimers-patients.html, archived at http://perma.cc/2CGF-KSEU.
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the Integrated Corporate Enterprise, or a combination of some or all of
them, also apparently neglected to mention that the controlling law in
California—as set forth by the Ninth Circuit and California’s Supreme
Court—is vastly different from the controlling law set forth by the Sixth
Circuit and Ohio’s Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
This Article extended my prior case study-based research publica-
tions to analyze a trending problem in social entrepreneurship that repre-
sents a coming wave of activity in the United States. Specifically, the Article
reviewed the property and financial rights implicated when ostensibly
socially beneficent LLCs pretextually pose as small businesses desirous
of serving people who suffer from disabilities. Brand-managed ostensible
social entrepreneurs often represent arms of greater multi-million dollar
integrated corporate enterprises that use the LLC and associated small
business owner story to wield mental disability antidiscrimination law
as a shield through which the integrated corporate enterprise can exploit
small municipalities’ zoning ordinances and relative lack of funding and
legal sophistication, threatening the municipality with costly legal action
should the municipality fail to change its zoning ordinances and permit
the corporate integrated enterprise to operate a 24-hour commercial busi-
ness deep in the heart of property zoned for single-family residential use.
The integrated corporate enterprise’s actions leave all but the in-
tegrated corporate enterprise drowning in the spillover effects of the enter-
prise’s negative externalities, including the real risks of material physical
harm and financial loss.
Despite using a limited case study analytic, this Article’s analysis
should educate interdisciplinary scholars, tribunals, and municipalities
of this emerging trend in social entrepreneurship with the nation’s
demographics shift to aging baby boomers suffering from afflictions sub-
ject to existing laws that integrated corporate enterprises can perversely
exploit to generate material cash flows from, as one such enterprise has
called them, the “frail elderly.” These corporate enterprises are simulta-
neously attempting to use superior resources to dupe the municipalities
and existing owners of single-family residential-zoned property. The
Article also serves to assist legitimate healthcare providers to avoid the
errors made by certain large corporate integrated enterprises so that
people suffering from disabilities indeed receive the care and the housing
they may seek.
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Simply put, given the consistent line of cases which govern the
FHAA’s judicial application of standing in the relevant federal circuit court,
state statutory law, or municipal zoning ordinances, municipalities should
ensure that they do not become the victim of purported social entrepre-
neurs attempting to extract literal and figurative economic rent-seeking,
which would lead to the municipality and existing property owners to either
seek declaratory relief from the courts or engage in their own quiet riot.
